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NOTES
Libel Actions by Political Organizations: Freedom From
Smear vs. Freedom to Criticise
As the recent municipal election campaign in Philadelphia neared its
finish, Republican spokesmen began to concentrate their fire on the Ameri-
cans for Democratic Action, a group whose Philadelphia membership
numbers about 800. The ADA was denounced as Communist "infil-
trated" and likened to a subversive front group.1 The ADA retaliated
by bringing an action for defamation against Republican Chairman Meade.-
To date, it seems that the only unincorporated associations which
have brought libel actions have been trade unions.3 Thus the group
suit represents a new frontier in the law of libel.4  The ADA's case ex-
emplifies a special problem in this field, for here is an action by a group
avowedly organized for purely political purposes. Furthermore success
to the ADA may foreshadow other actions by similarly constituted or-
ganizations, since the defamation of groups is no uncommon occurrence
in today's American political scene.5 The resulting tensions of first a
world war and now a cold war have led many a politician and for that
matter many a private citizen to mislabel opposing organizations as "Red",
"Communist" or "Fascist", or the like." Can a political group be libeled
with impunity, in the light of legal precedent? Should that type of or-
ganization be allowed to protect its reputation by the use of a libel action?
What if any special limitations should be applied to such suits to prevent
1. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Nov. 1, 1949, p. 1, col. 4.
2. ADA et al. v. Meade et al., Civil No. 860, Philadelphia Common Pleas No.
6, Sept. term 1949.
3. E.g., Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers Inc., 287 N.Y. 373, 39 N.E. 2d
919 (1942) ; Bradley et al. v. Conners et al., 169 Misc. 442, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 294 (Sup.
Ct. 1938); Hotel, Restaurant, Building Service Union v. Hotel and Club Employees
Union, 56 D. & C. 575 (Pa. 1946).
4. For a brilliant general discussion of the various problems of group libel,
especially racial libel, see Reisman, Democracy And Defamation; Control of Group
Libel, 42 COL. L. Rav. 721. See also Note, Statutory Problem of Group Defama-
tion, 47 CoL L. REv. 595 (1947) dealing with proposed criminal statutes to outlaw
the vilification of racial groups.
5. For a comprehensive analysis of the quantum and quality of libel in one
Presidential election campaign see BoNE, SMEA PoLircs-AN AxANysis oF 1940
CAMPAIGN LITEATURE, AMaaICAN COUNCIL ON PuBLIc AFFAIRS (1941). On the pro-
pensity of Congressmen to mislabel political groups, see Britt and McNefee, Did
The Publicity of The Dies Committee Influence Public Opinion?, 3 PUBLC OPINION
QUARTERLY 449 (1939); Gellhorn, A Report on a Report, 60 HAv. L. REv. 1193
(1947) ; Saunders, The Dies Committee: First Phase, 3 PUBuC OPINION QUARTERLY
223 (1939); Notes, Congressional Contempt Power In Investigations Into The
Area of Civil Liberties, 14 UNIv. or Cm. L. REv. 256 (1946), especially at 259, 260;
Protection From Defamation In Congressional Hearings, 16 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REv.
544 (1949).
6. It is interesting to note that after Meade first made his charge, Senators
Mundt and Martin made substantially similar assertions. Said Mundt: "The political
philosophy of the ADA runs along the same channels as that of the Communists ...
His [Meade's] charges that ADA is infiltrated with notorious members of Com-
munist-front organizations have been known to us for a long time." Philadelphia
Evening Bulletin, Nov. 1, 1949, p. 1, col. 3. Senator Martin congratulated Meade
for "his courage and patriotism in disclosing so vividly to the people of this city . . .
the close tie-up between leaders and members of the ADA with Communist Front
Organizations." Bulletin, Nov. 3, 1949, p. 1, col. 3.
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them from becoming a menace to free political debate? These three
problems are considered in this note. Since there has been found no re-
ported decision which has explicitly considered these questions, the answers
must be drawn from other more developed and analogous areas of libel
law.
LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR GRouP REcOVERY
Libel is defined as a false publication tending to bring another into
disrepute.7 Traditionally, the law has looked upon reputation as a prop-
erty interest-an asset of pecuniary value, and it is damage to that interest,
inflicted by the offending publication, which is the basis for every libel
action." Because of our "commercialized" concept of defamation the law
has been especially solicitous of injury done to professional reputations.
Professional reputation is a more apparent asset and damage to it may be
more readily ascertained. Hence any false allegation that another is unfit
to pursue his chosen occupation constitutes actionable defamation.9
Viewing the nature of libel in this light, it was easy for courts to
extend a cause of action to business corporations. There was a clear an-
alogy between this fictitious businessman and the normal businessman;
for each, the preservation of good name was essential to successful com-
mercial operations.'0 A slightly more difficult problem was posed when
charitable corporations brought suit. Though reputation was just as im-
portant to the professional success of a charitable corporation as it was
to any business, the analogy to the businessman was not quite so patent,
for charities did not engage in commerce nor did they earn profits.
Still, their success as an enterprise also depended upon good name. With-
out public confidence in their integrity they could not hope to elicit contri-
butions or gain sympathy for their cause. Thus the courts found that
charities had the same interest in reputation as the business corporation
and the professional man." Within recent years a cause of action was
extended to trade unions. The courts employed the same arguments
which had been used to rationalize both business and charitable corpora-
tion suits. The mere fact that this plaintiff was no fictitious person did
not lessen its need for protection, nor did the lack of incorporation alter
the analogous position of the union to the normal businessman.
12
Though there seem to have been no actions by other types of unin-
corporated associations, the following unexpressed but logical thesis arises
7. NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL § 29 (1914 ed.).
8. See generally Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REv. 445 (1915) ;
Veeder, History of Defamation, 3 COL. L. REv. 546 (1903).
9. Peck v. Tribune Co. 214 U.S. 185 (1909); PROSSER, TORTS, 802 (1941);
NEWELL, op. cit. supra note 7, § 176 et seq; 3 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 570 (1938).
10. Ohio M. Ry. Co. v. Press Pub. Co., 48 Fed. 206 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891);
Norske Ameriekinje v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n., 226 N.Y. 1, 122 N.E. 463
(1919): Gross Coal Co. v. Rose 126 Wis. 24, 115 N.W. 225 (1905). See YANK-
WIcH, ESSAYS IN THE LAW OF LIBEL, 95-102 (1924).
11. Finnish Temperance Society v. Finnish Socialistic Pub. Co., 238 Mass. 345,
130 N.E. 845 (1921); New York Society For Suppression of Vice v. Macfadden
Publications Inc. 129 Misc. 408. 221 N.Y. Supp. 563 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Chinese Em-
pire Reform Ass'n. v. Chinese Daily Newspaper Pub. Co., 13 Brit. Col. 141 (1907).
It should also be noted that an individual's professional reputation gained in connec-
tion with the holdinz of some honorarv non-nrofit office, will be protected from
defamation. See McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binn. 178 (Pa. 1806).
12. Cases cited note 3 supra. But cf., Stone v. Textile Examiners & Shrinkers
Employer's Ass'n., 137 App. Div. 655. 122 N.Y. Supp. (Sup. Ct. 1910) (Recovery
denied where union could not show damage to its credit standing or commercial
reputation.) See also GATLEY, LIBEL & SLANDER IN A CrvIm AcTION 460, 464
(1938).
from the corporation and union precedents: any organization may recover
for a libel, if it depends upon good reputation for success in its field of
endeavor, if it fits the fundamental analogy to the professional man.'5
Thus if unions may recover, so also should the YMCA, the Red Cross,
or the Community Chest. And are political organizations distinguish-
able? Just as any non-profit group, they depend upon community sup-
port for subsistence, and they too develop professional reputations. Un-
less some special exception be made, a group such as the ADA or the
NAM should have the capacity to sue for a libel.
NECESSITY FOR ALLOWING GROUP SuITs
Those opposed to the extension of group libel have set forth the
general argument that there is no real social benefit to be gained by allow-
ing the group a remedy, that any expansion of the area of actionable
defamation automatically decreases the field of free discussion, and that
the best antidote to occasional abuses of free speech is simply more
speech.' 4 Is there, then, any real public interest to be secured by granting
an action to political organizations?
At first glance defamation suits and democracy do seem to be ap-
parent oppositites in that the prevalence of the former imply restrictions
on the latter.15  But this need not be so. An efficient civil remedy for
libel is a necessary limitation on free discussion; its existence prevents a
right to speak from becoming a license to smear.' 6 Moreover libelous
words become dangerous words for democracy when calculated to inflame
public indignation against others by arousing community hatreds. Political
vilification of individuals or groups of individuals can conceivably destroy
the climate of tolerance so necessary for the survival of free expression
and substitute an atmosphere of unreasoned passion.'7 Totalitarian forces
operating within European democracies found group libel a most effective
method to attack mercilessly their enemies and incite antipathies between
various classes of society. Nazi spokesmen of the Weimar Republic days,
took advantage of the legal loopholes in libel. Not only were "Jews",
"Bankers" and like amorphos groups the targets of their vilification, but
also established churches and civic gocieties. The use of these tactics
helped greatly their effort to debase democratic institutions and over-
13. See for instance Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers Inc., supra note 3,
and Comments, 27 CORNELL L. Q. 583 (1942) ; 8 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 785 (1942). On
the procedural problems involved when an association brings suit see, Sturges, Unin-
corporated Associations As Parties To Actions, 33 YALE L.J. 383 (1924). Some
states have enabling statutes which allow the association to sue in its entity name,
e.g., N.Y. GEN. Ass'WN. LAW §§ 12, 13 (1946); Cf. United Mine Workers of America
v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1921); Singing Society v. Turn Verein, 163
Pa. 265, 29 At. 918 (1894).
14. See generally CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 124-30
(1947) ; CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECHi 285 (1941) ; Deulsch, Freedom of the Press
and the Mails, 36 MICH. L. REv. 703 (1938); Freedom of Speech And Group Libel
Statutes, 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 221 (1941) ; c.f. Noral v. Hearst Publications Inc.,
40 Cal. App. 348, 104 P.2d 860 (1940); Ryckman v. Delavan 25 Wend. 185 (1840).
15. Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (invalidating a statute which
provided an injunction as a method of relief against recurrent libels.) ; cf. dissenting
opinion of Edgerton J. in Sweeny v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942):
"Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate."
16. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304 (Mass. 1825); 3 BL. CoMM. *151;
COOLEY, CoNsTITUTIoNAL LIMITATIONS 883-86 (1927).
17. See, Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 Sup. Ct. 894 (1949) (dissenting opinion);
LIPPMAN, PUBLIC OPINION 79-130 (1921) ; Pound, op. cit. supra note 8 at 450 et. seq.
19501 N7OTES
868 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98
throw the German Republic.' 8 Profiting from experience, other free
European countries have found it necessary to expand their libel law to
protect their freedom.'9 Certainly as a method of preserving dispassion
in public discussion, adequate libel laws can be used to some advantage,
and should not always be feared as arch-enemies of democracy.
20
Furthermore, today organized political groups are necessary institu-
tions as agencies of expression, and for, this reason they should be pro-
tected. Sentiment on public issues is now molded swiftly through the de-
vices of mass communication and most private individuals do not have
ready access to these means, so as to put forward effectively their own
ideas.21 The group which allows concerted action to promote a view-
point is the most efficient method whereby the single citizen can make his
voice heard.22  Political parties can not always adequately serve this pur-
pose, for our two party system makes these institutions too amorphous
to satisfy the needs of the individual who desires to exert his influence
for specific objectives. Thus in politics there exists a myriad of small
private organizations which campaign for definite objectives-businessmen
combine to publicize their aguments for or against certain governmental
policies or proposed legislation, and the same may be said for doctors,
lawyers, veterans and innumerable other classes of citizens.23  Each of
these formal groups has a strong interest in presenting its case to the
public. Moreover, it is to the public's benefit that each be heard, for
competing ideas are essential to democracy.24 Hence the value of groups
to a modern free society.
The vilifier who fears no lawsuit is free to ridicule an opposing or-
ganization, stereotype its members, and deter others from joining, aiding
or even tolerating the defamed group. Thus discredited, the group be-
comes ineffective as an agency of expression. 25 Both it and its individual
18. For an authoritative analysis of the use of libel by the Nazis and Communists
as an anti-democratic weapon, see Lowenstein, Legislative Control of Political Ex-
tremisimn in European Democracies, 38 CoL. L. REV. 725 (1938); Reisman, mpra,
note 4, at 728-34; Reisman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Com-
ment, 42 CoL. L. REv. 1085 (1942).
19. Ibid.
20. CHAFE, GovERNMENT AND MAss CommuNIcAio Ns 471-86 (1947); ERNsT,
THE FRST FREEDoM 41-56 (1946); The Press In The Contemporary Scene, 219
ANNALS, at 44-93 (Willey and Casey ed. 1942).
21. Pressure Groups and Propaganda, 179 ANNALS, 1-68 (Childs ed. 1935).
22. Ibid, 68-81. For the role played by various private organizations in mold-
ing opinion in the 1948 election see, Parties and Politics: 1948, 259 ANNALS 113-144
(Rohlfing and Charlesworth ed. 1948).
23. For example: The National Association of Manufacturers, The American
Medical Association, The American Bar Association, The American Legion, The
American Veterans Committee, The American Farm Bureau Federation. The im-
portant work of these and other groups in the field of government and politics is
analyzed in Pressure Groups and Propaganda, op. cit. supra note 21, at 1-81, 136-158.
24. ERNST, op. cit. supra note 21, at 2-28: Ernst. The So Called Market Place
of Thought, 2 BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 86 (1942); Horack, The Right to Hear, 2
BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 6 (1942). Cf., Mr. Justice Black in Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 at 20 "[The First Amendment] rests on the assumption
that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public. . . ." (emphasis added).
25. For example note the damaging consequences of the attack by the House
Un-American Activities Committee on the Southern Welfare Congress which ap-
parently exaggerated the Communist influence within that group and severely crippled
its effectiveness. The House report and the evidence to sustain it and the damaging
consequences of the House report are analyzed in Gellhorn, op. cit supra, Note 5.
members lose their access to the idea market, and without a means of
being heard, their right to free speech becomes useless.26
Neither the tort remedy of the individual members, nor present
criminal sanctions are adequate to deter the potential group-defamer. A
member of a defamed class may only sue when he can prove that the
libel referred directly to him.27 It is not enough that the offending words
embraced the entire group to which he belongs; the plaintiff must show
further that the words refer peculiarly and particularly to him.28  As a
practical matter this limits recovery to cases where the defamed group is
small and the innuendo patently clear.29  This stringent3 ° requirement
arises from a judicial fear that if the rule were otherwise, countless
plaintiffs would appear after every group defamation, with little or no
basis for relief.31
The criminal remedy is likewise inadequate to deter the usual vilifier.
Occasionally the state punishes group defamation, but the criminal action,
unlike the civil, is derived from the highly offensive character of the words
and their natural tendency to incite violence or disorder.8 2  Thus the state
acts only to curb a defamation when its potential effect is dangerous to
society.3 3 This rationale of the limited usage of criminal libel is in accord
with the traditional constitutional conception of limitations on free speech,
viz. that the state may only punish when utterance of the words causes a
clear and present danger to the community. 34 Both judges and prosecutors
have long, argued that prevalent usage of the criminal action could pave
the way for dangerous abuses in the future, and are reluctant to employ
the device to deter defamation.35  The number of criminal libel cases
26. See Note 24 .vupra.
27. PRossER, TORTS 791 (1941); 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 564 (1938). For
general discussion of the individual member's right of recovery when a group is
defamed see Note, Defaination of A Group, 21 NoTm DA M LAw. 21 (1945).
28. E.g., Constitution Pub. Co. v. Leathers, 48 Ga. App. 429, 172 S.E. 923 (1934)
(newspaper libeled family, no recovery allowed to individual member); Louisville
Times v. Stivers, 252 Ky. 843, 68 S.W.2d 411 (1934) (No recovery for plaintiff
for libel aimed at the "clan Stivers"); Sumner v. Buel 12 Johns 474 (N.Y. 1815)
(No recovery for individual officer when officers of regiment defamed) ; Ryckman v.
Delavan 25 Wend. 185 (N.Y. 1840) (defendant libeled the brewers "on the hill";
no recovery for plaintiff, one of six brewers "on the hill").
29. E.g., Schomberg v. Walker, 132 Cal. 224, 64 Pac. 290 (1901) (One of defamed
class of five Trustees allowed to recover); Welsh v. Tribune Co. 83 Mich. 661, 47
N.W. 562 (1890) (juror allowed to recover when jury libeled) ; Gross v. Cantor 270
N.Y. 93, 200 N.E. 542 (1936) (one of city's half dozen radio news editors could sue
for libel of that class). See further Watts-Wagner Co., Inc. v. General Motors Co.
64 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) ; Bornman v. Star Co., 174 N.Y. 212, 66 N.E. 723
(1903).
30. It was especially stringent in Noral v. Hearst Publications, 40 Cal. App. 2d
348, 104 P.2d 860 (1940) where defendant charged that the "officers" of a union were
collecting dues just to disseminate "Moscow propaganda", and in other ways inferred
that the "officers" were Communists. There were only three officers in the union,
but the court held that no particular individual had been injured by the publication.
31. See Service Parking Corporation v. Washington Times Co. 92 F.2d 502, 505,
67 App. D.C. 351, 355 (1937) ; Ryckman v. Delavan, 25 Wend. 186, 199 (N.Y. 1840) ;
Sumner v. Buel 12 Johns 474, 478 (N.Y. 1815) ; SALAmOND, TORTS 529 (7th ed. 1928).
32. People v. Gordan, 63 Cal. App. 627, 219 Pac. 486 (1st Div. 1923) ; Alumbaugh
v. State 39 Ga. App. 559, 147 S.E. 909 (1929) ; State v. Brady, 44 Kan. 435, 24 Pac.
1110 (1902); Crane v. State 14 Oka. Crim. Rep. 30, 166 Pac. 110 (1917).
33. People v. Edmundson 168 Misc. 142, 4 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Gen. Sess. 1938). Cf.,
Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
34. Cf., Terminiello v. Chicago 69 Sup. Ct. 894 (1949) ; Pennekamp v. Florida
328 U.S. 331 (1946) ; Bridges v. California 314 U.S. 252 (1941) ; all recent decisions
showing that the clear and present danger test is to be stringently applied in criminal
actions involving free speech.
35. Reisman, mupra note 4 at 748-50.
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brought in this country is comparatively small 3 6 Furthermore today,
especially, courts seem alerted to protect civil liberties by curbing the
state's power to silence discussion.8 7 Because of this and because criminal
libel runs counter to our traditional legal grain, it seems improbable and
unfeasible that this method be used to prevent group defamation.
Since both criminal and individual tort actions are ineffective to pro-
tect political organizations from defamation, and since that protection-
at least to a limited extent-is desirable, the most effective solution is to
allow the group to seek its own remedy. This can and should be done,
while still allowing a maximum of open political debate.
NECESSARY LImITATIONS UPON THE GRouPs RIGHT OF ACTION
Of course no political group should be insulated against responsible
attacks. In the field of politics, scrutiny and criticism-even harsh
criticism-of the active participants is essential; indeed the need is es-
pecially strong where our concern is with impersonal entities whose raison
d'8tre is propaganda. Only when that criticism amounts to reckless smear-
ing should it be actionable . 8  Hence if the group is to be allowed to sue
for libel, existing limitations and defenses to that action must be adapted
to safeguard the public's interest in free discussion. How can this best be
done?
Defense of Privilege.--In the ordinary libel suit between two private
citizens, truth is the only absolute defense.3 9 Where the subject of a libel
embraces a matter of public interest, the courts have recognized the need
to permit some latitude in criticism. Thus a limited privilege exists in all
jurisdictions to make false and even damaging statements about those who
participate in political affairs.
The majority apply what is known as the "Fair Comment" rule. Un-
der the strict application of this rule the privilege is confined solely to
statements of opinion, made without malice (i.e., made upon probable cause
and with proper motive); whenever the criticism contains false and dam-
aging assertions of fact, the privilege fails.40 The minority rule, more
liberal to the critic, exonerates any publication, whether fact or opinion
so long as it was made with no malice.
41
Debate over the pros and cons of each rule has consumed many pages
of legal literature; a consensus of commentators favors the minority.
4
2
36. I CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS Co mIUNIcTIoNs 115 (1947).
37. See Note 34 supra. Cf., State v. Klapprott 127 N.J.L. 395, 22 A.2d 877
(1941) (leclaring invalid a statute making it criminal to vilify any racial or religious
group).
38. The seemingly harsh decision of the court in Noral v. Hearst Publications,
spra note 30, may be partially explained on the theory that the court was anxious to
protect scrutiny and investigation of groups which show possible Communist in-
clinations.
39. NawALL, op. cit. supra note 7, § 956.
40. The leading case declaratory of the majority rule is Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam,
59 Fed. 530 (8th Cir. 1894). See also Foley v. Press Pub. Co., 226 App. Div. 535, 235
N.Y. Supp. 340 (1929) ; Peck v. Coos Bay Times Pub. Co. 122 Ore. 408, 259 Pac.
307 (1927) for extensive discussions of the rationalization of the rule. As to the vague
meaning of malice in libel law, see PRossER, ToRTs 849 (1941).
41. The leading cases declaratory of the minority rule are Snively v. Record Pub.
Co. 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921) ; Coleman v. MacLennan 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac.
281 (1908). Actually many jursidictions have their own slightly different formulations
of the rule. For collection of cases see Note, 110 A.L.R. 393 (1937).
42. See Hall, Preserving Liberty of The Press, 10 CALIF. L. REv. 84 (1921);
Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TEXAS L. Rlv. 41 (1924); Harper, Privileged Defamation,
22 VA. L. REv. 642 (1936); Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49
Certainly the fact-opinion distinction required under the "Fair Comment"
rule is tenuous as a matter of logic, 43 and certainly when courts have
sought to apply it literally, confusion and ambiguity have resulted. An
assertion that the plaintiff "championed measures opposed to the moral
interests of the community" was held to be an assertion of fact, and a
libel.44 An assertion that the plaintiff "would deprive a world war veteran
of his last crumb of bread," was held to be only a statement of opinion.45
An assertion that the plaintiff was "devoid of any knowledge of the cus-
toms of polite men . . . and cares no more for political principles than
he does for the Silurian Age in geology." was found to be only comment,4 3
but yet the same jurisdiction has held that a charge that a congressman
was "unpatriotic" is an assertion of fact, and libelous if false.47 In attempt-
ing to elucidate on the distinction between fact and opinion another court
once said: "mere exaggeration, slight irony, or wit, or all those delightful
touches of style which go to make an article readable, do not push beyond
the limitations of fair comment." 48 To this should be added a caveat;
some decisions, such as those noted above, and others, show that the line
between delightful stylisms and defamatory slurs can be purely a matter
of judicial tastes.50
Too often in cases of political libel, a rigid application of the fact-
opinion distinction breeds more confusion than satisfaction. This is es-
pecially true when the offending charge relates to the plaintiff's motives
or ideological beliefs-a most common type of libel in politics. 6 ' Such
statements are blended indistinguishably with fact and opinion. Words
such as "subversive", "reactionary" and "un-American" may connote the
existence of dangerous facts, but yet they are also mere value judgments.
Should they be treated as assertions of fact or opinion? There is even
greater difficulty when such statements are made about groups. In those
instances the statement is usually a generalization based on the motives
of many persons who make up the group. Take for example one of
Meade's charges: "Foreign isms whether Communism, Socialism or
ADAism must be crushed before they spread into our American institu-
tions." By one interpetation it could be said that the statement is
opinion-it merely argues the undesirableness of the group's theories. An-
other interpetation might hold that the words assert facts for they impute
the existence of subversive activities within the group. It would seem use-
less to confuse the issue, the court, and the jury by picking apart all
possible inferences to be deduced from the charge.6
CoL L. Rlv. 875 (1949); Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion 23 HARv. L. REv.
413 (1910). See also PRossR, ToRTs 840 (1941); 3 RESTATEENT, ToRTs § 613
(1938).
43. Cf., WIGMORE, EvmFNcz § 1919 (3rd ed. 1940).
44. Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353. 83 N.W. 110 (1900).
45. Lakaszewicz v. Dziadulewicz, 198 Wis. 605, 225 N.W. 172 (1929).
46. Duffy v. New York Evening Post Co., 109 App. Div. 471 96 N.Y. Supp.
629 (1st Dept. 1905).
47. Lunn v. Littauer, 187 App. Div. 808, 125 N.Y. Supp. 657 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
48. Briarcliffe Lodge Hotel v. Citizens Sentinel Pub. Inc. 260 N.Y. 106, 118-19,
183 N.E. 193, 198 (1932).
49. Notes 44, 45, 46, 47 supra.
50. E.g., Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co. 237 Ill. App. 347 (1925) ; Hall v.
Binghamton Press Co., 263 App. Div. 403, 33 N.Y.S.2d 840, (3rd Dept. 1942) ; Hoan
v. Journal Co. 238 Wis. 311, 298 N.W. 228 (1941).
51. Noel, supra note 42, at 881-87.
52. Compare the varying results reached by the courts in the Sweeney cases.
Drew Pearson implied that Sweeney, a Congressman, opposed the appointment of a
particular judge because of Sweeney's anti-semitism. Sweeney brought seventy-five
actions across the country. The courts divided sharply on whether the statement was
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As constantly reiterated by courts of both the minority and majority
jurisdictions, it is the real aim of the law to make tortious only wantonly
reckless attacks.53 The fact-opinion distinction requirement is too likely to
obscure rather than clarify this determination and the minority rule should
be adequate. The critical test is not whether the statement contains any
possible inference of false fact, but rather whether it was made upon
probable cause: does the defendant have information to back up his
charge.5 4 There is no need to place a burden on the political critic of know-
ing in advance whether his words are so couched that a stringent court
will find in them no falsification of fact. Enough to require that when
he uses dangerous words, he do so without recklessness-without malice.
Within recent years there has developed with Fair Comment jurisdic-
tions a tendency to ignore the fact-opinion dichotomy. This has been
marked in cases where the necessity for preserving justifiable discussion
is clear and urgent. Thus the courts have ignored obvious falsifications of
fact where it was thought there was no malice in the statement's making.55
A great trend was once predicted in which states employing the Fair Com-
ment rule would openly renounce the fact-opinion distinction and embrace
the minority law.56 Such open renunciation has not been apparent; never-
theless tacit ignoring of more rigorous earlier precedents has tended to
obliterate the meaning and substance of that reqatirement. This liberal
tendency should be followed when the rules of privilege are adapted to fit
the needs posed by political group suits.
There is much confusion on the question of which party has the
burden of proof on the matter of privilege. In many jurisdictions there
are conflicting decisions and dicta, some decisions placing the entire burden
on the defendant, some placing it on the plaintiff.57 In still other juris-
dictions it is the rule that the defendant must first show that because of
the subject matter of the alleged libel a privilege would normally exist,
and the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the occasion for
privilege was abused in the particular case.58 Until ". . . defendant has
established the fact of a privileged occasion, plaintiff need not offer evi-
dence of malice. . . " 59 When applying this rule to cases involving
politicians, some trial courts have become hopelessly entangled. Often they
an actionable libel. For varying interpretations of the statement see Sweeney v.
Schenectady Union Publishing Co. 122 F2d 288 (2nd Cir. 1941) (motion to dismiss
denied) ; Sweeney v. Caller Times Co. 41 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Tex. 1941) ; Sweeney
v. Capital News Publishing Co. 37 F. Supp. 355 (D. Idaho 1941) (motion to dismiss
granted because the statements were obviously privileged from the face of the com-
plaint).
53. See notes 40 and 41 supra.
54. See Hall supra note 42. See PRossER, TORTS 840 (1941).
55. Cf. Fleckenstein v. Freidman 266 N.Y. 19, 193 N.E. 537 (1934) ; Fort Worth
Press v. Davis 96 S.W.2d 416 (1936) (assertion that plaintiff "wasted" $80,000 on
public project privileged as fair comment though actually plaintiff bad spent only
$17,500). See also Sweeney v. Patterson 128 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1942) cert. denied
317 U.S. 678 (1942) ; Kenna v. Daily Mirror Inc. 250 App. Div. 625, 295 N.Y. Supp.
219 (1st Dept. 1937).
56. Hallen, supra note 42 at 70.
57. Compare Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. 404, 2 Atl. 513 (1886) with O'Donnell v.
Philadelphia Record Co., 356 Pa. 307, 51 A.2d 775 (1947) ; cf. Hoan v. Journal Co.,
238 Wis. 311, 298 N.W. 228 (1941) (apparently holding if an article is libelous at all
there is no privilege). For a further instance of confusion in formulating any rule
see Usher v. Severance 20 Me. 9 (1841). See note 60 infra.
58. Peterson v. Steenson, 113 Minn. 87, 129 N.W. 147 (1910) ; Cook v. Pulitzer
Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 326, 145 S.W. 480 (1912) ; Ashcroft v. Hammond, 197 N.Y. 488,
90 N.E. 1117 (1910).
59. SEELmAx, LIBEL AND SLANDER IN NEv YORK § 528 (1933).
have in effect placed the whole burden upon the defendant, which is cer-
tainly not in accord with either the purpose or substance of the rule.60
Certainly when a political group sues, from the very face of the com-
plaint it should be clear that the subject of the remark was a matter of
public interest, and the occasion was thus privileged. Hence there should
arise a presumption of a privilege. 61 But this presumption should have
no further effect than necessitating that the group prove as part of its
case that the offending statement was false. 2 The group should never be
required to prove that the defendant was actuated by an improper motive
or that defendant had no reasonable grounds upon which to base his charge.
The imposition of such a burden might, in some cases, force the group to
perform the impossible task of bringing forth evidence of the defendant's
private knowledge and personal feelings. It may be asked: why should the
group even be required to show that the statement actually was untrue?
For one thing the group has more ready" access to the sources of evidence
with which to prove the falsity of a remark about itself. In the ADA
case, for instance, it should be easy enough for the group to disprove
Meade's charge of Communist "infiltration" by simply introducing evi-
dence that the officers and more prominent spokesmen are anti-com-
munists. Thus for the political critic who is willing to gamble all, and
makes his assertion on a good "hunch", the rule above would at least serve
the purpose of forcing the group's hand, by requiring it to lay bare the
necessary sources of information, and thus give the defendant a chance to
smoke out the truth.6a Again, the placing of the burden to disprove
privilege on the organization would lessen the possibility of groundless
nuisance suits on its part. In this manner groups could not use the
threat of unjustified legal action as a weapon to silence responsible ad-
versaries.
It is not mere speculation to suggest changes in the rules of privilege
as they should be applied to group suits. From their very nature those
rules are flexible; 64 their creation and application has always called for
60. See Warren v. Pulitzer Pub. Co. 336 Mo. 184, 78 S.W.2d 404 (1934) ; Comt-
pare Ashcroft v. Hammond, 197 N.Y. 488, 90 N.E. 1177 (1910) with. Kenna v. Daily
Mirror Inc. 250 App. Div. 625, 295 N.Y. Supp. 219 (1st Dept. 1937). Compare
Democrat Pub. Co. v. Harvey, 181 Ky. 730, 205 S.W. 908 (1918) with Weinstein v.
Rhorer 240 Ky. 679, 42 S.W.2d 892 (1931). See further SEELMAN, op. cit. supra note
59, § 536. See further 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 604 (1938). Cf. Jones v. Express
Pub. Co. 87 Cal. App. 246, 262 Pac. 78 (1927) (it is "duty" of citizen to criticise
political figures, therefore malice will not be presumed where occasion is privileged).
Clancy v. Daily News Co. 202 Minn. 1, 277 N.W. 264 (1938) ; MacLean v. Merriman
42 S.D. 394, 175 N.W. 878 (1920) (to the same effect).
61. Cf. Kenna v. Daily Mirror Inc. 250 App. Div. 625, N.Y. Supp. 219 (1st
Dept. 1937) (complaint on its face held to raise a privilege, burden on plaintiff at the
outset to prove abuse of privilege) ; Gattis v. Kilgo, 128 N.C. 402, 38 S.E. 931 (1901)
(where complaint showed that alleged libel was on public matter, burden on Plain-
tiff at the outset to disprove privilege).
62. Proof of falsity creates an inference of malice which should overcome the
presumption of privilege. See Cohalan v. N.Y. Press Co. 212 N.Y. 344, 347, 106
N.E. 115 (1914) ("It is one of the well settled rules of the law of libel that malice
may be inferred from the falsity of a defamatory publication"). Cf. Meglein v. Golder
317 Pa. 437, 177 Atl. 47 (1935) (falsity plus "inherent malice" in article itself create
inference of malice destroying privilege).
63. Cf. Sweeney v. Caller-Times Pub. Co. 41 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Tex. 1941)
(court indicates difficulty of requiring defendant to carry burden of proving truth
or partial truth when allegation is one going to motives and beliefs of plaintiff). In
the ADA case, defendant Meade has attempted to utilize discovery procedure to harass
the plaintiff by requiring it to submit complete information on the political affiliations
and ideological beliefs of every member of the group.
64. See notes 40 and 41 .rupra. Cf. Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n. 126 W. Va.
292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943) (setting forth reasons for discarding majority rule in favor
of minority rule of privilege).
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judicial statesmanship, not devotion to dogma; their function is solely
that of balancing the need to protect a plaintiff's reputation with the pub-
lic's interest in free discussion. In the past when the urgency arose, the
courts have stretched or contracted them so as to best fit that function.6 5
Assuredly, then, the rules can be adequately adapted to fit the particular
problems of group libel.
Limitation as to Actionable Words.-Suppose that Meade had
charged that the ADA was "an organization of quacks." The statement
could logically be proven to be an abuse of privilege, but would it be ac-
tionable?
To say such things of private individuals can be libelous, 66 but the
courts have long admonished politician plaintiffs that theirs is an occupa-
tion calling for thick skins and for them there must be no recovery for
the less injurious aspersions of character. 67  As a consequence of this
judicial attitude, there are numerous decisions, though in most jurisdic-
tions no formulated rule, holding that when a political candidate sues for
libel no action will lie unless the offending publication, on its face, can
wreak substantial damage to the plaintiff's reputation. 68  This reasoning
has been further extended to apply to private citizens, who, though not
candidaies themselves, engage in behind the scenes political manipulations.
Such persons, say the courts, must stand in the same limelight of publicity
and adverse criticism as do avowed candidates for office.6 9
By further analogy the same policy could and should be extended to
cover private political groups. If they desire to participate in the rough
and tumble of the arena of public affairs they should also be able "to take
it," 70 to the extent that there will be no redress unless the critic really
dealt harshly with their reputations. Here again the need to prevent
nuisance actions is fundamental.
71
65. Cf. City of Chicago v. Tribune 307 Ill. 595, 139 N.E. 86 (1923) ; City of
Albany v. Meyer 99 Cal. App. 651, 279 Pac. 213 (1929) (absolute privilege extended
to criticise municipal governments) ; Tanner v. Gault 20 Ohio App. 243, 153 N.E. 124
(1925) (absolute privilege extended to county commissioners for statements made
in course of official duties). See Bigelow v. Brumley 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N.E.2d 584
(1941) (discussing desirability of extending privilege to lobbyists). See also Note
155 A.L.R. 1346 (1945) for the flexibility in application of the rules of absolute
privilege.
66. NvEwEu, op. cit. mtpra note 7 at 64.
67. See Nevada State Journal Pub. Co. v. Henderson 294 Fed. 60, 62 (9th Cir.
1923) ; cert. denoied. 264 U.S. 591 (1924) ; cf. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos,
320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943) (". . . loose language or undefined slogans are . . . part
of the conventional give and take in politics").
68. E.g. Sweeney v. Philadelphia Record Co., 126 F.2d 53 (3rd Cir. 1942);
Tanzer v. Crowley Publishing Co. 240 App. Div. 203, 268 N.Y. Supp. 620 (4th Dept.
1934) (complaints dismissed on demurrer because courts could find no serious
damaging effect in the words). See Note, Libel Actions Brought by Public Officials
51 YALE L.J. 693 (1942).
69. McLean v. Merriman 42 S.D. 394, 175 N.W. 878 (1920); cf. Poleski v.
Polish American Publishing Co., 254 Mich. 15, 235 N.W. 841 (1931); Peck v. Coos
Bay Times Publishing Co., 122 Ore. 408, 259 Pac. 307 (1927).
70. See People v. Drucker 167 Misc. 557, 559, 4 N.Y.S.2d 360, 362 (Kings County
Ct. 1938).
71. The maze of seemingly conflicting decisions can hardly be rationalized on any
other grounds. See Tanzer v. Crowley Publishing Co. 240 App. Div. 203, 205, 268
N.Y. Supp. 620, 622 (4th Dept. 1934), "One who holds public office must expect
criticism. It may be captious, ill-timed, and without foundation in fact; but outside
of a clear charge of corruption or gross incompetence . . . there is no libel." This
from a fair comment jurisdiction with decisions holding that any damaging falsification
of fact constitutes a libel.
There is one pitfall in the above. In some jurisdictions there seems
to be a hard and fast requirement that political candidates may only re-
cover upon words which are libelous per se.72 "Libelous per se" has had
an elusive definition in the law. Most commentators and higher courts
have insisted that it means nothing more than libelous without the show-
ing of an innuendo, i.e., without proof of additional facts to show how the
words can be damaging.73 A few courts, however, have distorted the
definition to a meaning synonymous with slander per se. Spoken words
to be slanderous per se must impute to the plaintiff criminal or immoral
conduct or a loathesome disease.74 Thus in a few jurisdictions it has been
held that a politician may only recover special damages unless the words
actually impute criminality or highly immoral acts. These decisions have
sometimes meted out severe justice to public figures. Accordingly a false
charge that the plaintiff was a traitor to his party was bluntly dismissed
on demurrer because the words imputed no criminal or immoral conduct.75
The same was held for falsifications that "crooks" or "underworld" charac-
ters were backing the plaintiff's candidacy.7 6 Some have attempted to
rationalize the false analogy to slander per se on the grounds that deserv-
ing plaintiffs may still recover special damages under the rule.77  This
means however that the plaintiff must prove each cent of damages, where
the offending words do not charge a crime. Reputation may be an asset,
but it is not so tangible a piece of property that damage to it may normally
be precisely determined. The ordinary libel plaintiff simply cannot reduce
his injury to an exact pecuniary sum. Thus the allowance of special
damages alleviates little the hardship of the distorted libel per se require-
ment.78
Recent decisions indicate that this overly harsh rule is being dis-
carded.7 9 Clearly its rigorous application would bestow a virtual carte
blanche on those who choose to hurl epithets in the game of politics.
8 0
Thick skins for politicians may be a feasible requirement, but not to the
extent of forbidding redress for any vilification except an imputation of
crime. Good men would not easily be attracted into public affairs if
such were the case.8 ' Private groups could certainly be smeared out of
existence, if with impunity they could be mislabeled as "communist,"
"Fascist" or "pink". Nor would the allowance of special damages be of
much aid to an organization, for the most that the group could usually
72. Steenson v. Wallace, 144 Kan. 730, 62 P.2d 907 (1936) ; Tanzer v. Crowley
Publishing Co., mtpra note 71; Cotulla v. Kerr 74 Tex. 89, 11 S.W. 1058 (1889) ; cf.
Shaw v. Crandon Printing Co. 154 Wis. 601, 143 N.W. 698 (1913).
73. PRossER, TORTS 797 (1941) ; cf. Peck v. Tribune Co. 214 U.S. 185 (1909)
Contra: O'Connell v. Press Pub. Co. 214 N.Y. 352, 108 N.E. 556 (1915). The
O'Connell case has led to much confusion in New York and has been widely criticised.
See SEELmAN, LIBEL AND SLANDER iN NEw Yoiu §§ 43-59 for a detailed criticism.
74. 3 RFSTATEMENT, TORTS § 575 (1938).
75. Sheridan v. Davies 139 Kan. 256, 31 P.2d 51 (1934).
76. Davis v. Ferguson 246 Ill. App. 318 (1927); Otero v. Ewing 165 La. 398,
115 So. 633 (1927). Cf. Duffy v. New York Evening Post Co. 109 App. Div. 471,
96 N.Y. Supp. 629 (1st Dept. 1905). See Riesman, Democracy and Defamaton: Fair
Game and Fair Colnunt If, 42 COL. L. REv. 1282, 1293-96.
77. See especially Judge Clark's dissenting opinion in Sweeney v. Schenectady
Union Publishing Co., 122 F.2d 288 (2n-d Cir. 1941) at 291.
78. Cf. McCoRmicx, LAW OF DAMAGES § 114 (1935).
79. Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publishing Co., supra note 77; Bennet v.
Commercial Advertiser Association 230 N.Y. 125, 129 N.E. 343 (1920). Hall v.
Binghamton Press Co. 263 App. Div. 403, 33 N.Y.S.2d 840 (3rd Dept. 1942).
80. Riesman op. cit. supra note 76 at 1293-98.
81. This was the theory of Mr. Justice Taft when he argued against overly
stringent requirements for the recovery of politician plaintiffs. See Post Publishing
Co. v. Hallam 59 Fed. 530, 541 (6th Cir. 1893).
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prove in this way would be losses of contributions resulting from the
libel-an almost impossible task.
Where should the line be drawn; when can it be said that a falsifi-
cation is clearly capable of doing damage to the group? In measuring
the defamatory character of given words, courts have often taken into
account existing community mores and prejudices.8 2  Thus in 18th cen-
tury England it was libelous to call a Protestant a "Jacobite." 83 In the
South it is a defamation to say that a white had negro blood in his veins.8 4
In wartime it is defamatory to infer that another is a "slacker", or de-
sirous of avoiding the draft.8 5 The history of the defamatory character
of a false charge of communism affords another interesting example.
During the Red Scare of the Twenties the assertion that another was a
"Communist", a "Red", or an "anarchist" was a defamation.,6  By the
time that Russia entered the war against Germany such charges were
apparently not actionable.8 7 But cold war antipathies reversed that trend,
reversed it so far that nowadays an allegation which merely imputes that
another acts like a communist is libelous.88 There are precedents, then,
for the proposition that social attitudes, more than dictionary definitions,
determine the damaging nature of words.8 9
Those cases point the way for a sensible method to be used in de-
termining the degree of damage which an alleged libel is capable of in-
flicting. A test whereby the words are analyzed in terms of their con-
notation to various community segments should be employed, rather than
an arbitrary requirement that the words must simply impute some par-
ticular degree of criminal or immoral conduct. In each particular case
82. Peck v. Tribune Co. 214 U.S. 185 (1909) is the leading case on this
proposition. See further, Note, Community Segment in Defamation Actions, 58 YALE
L.J. 1387 (1949).
83. How v. Prin, 87 Eng. Rep. 1128, 7 Mod. Rep. 107, 2 Salk. 694 (1702).
84. Toye v. McMahon, 21 La. Ann. 308 (1869).
85. Choctaw Coal and Mining Co. v. Lillich 204 Ala. 533, 86 So. 383 (1920).
86. Ogren v. Rockford Star Pub. Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919) ("Social-
ist") ; Von Gerichten v. Seitz, 94 App. Div. 30, 87 N.Y. Supp. 968 (1904) (Imputa-
tion of Communism or anarchism); Toomey v. Jones 124 Okla. 167, 254 Pac. 736
(1926) ("Red").
87. Garriga v. Richfield, 174 Misc. 315, 20 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1940). Cf. McDonald
v. Lieber 184 La. 811, 167 So. 450 (1936), Hays v. American Defense Society 252
N.Y. 266, 169 N.E. 380 (1929) (courts uncertain as to defamatory character of
charge).
88. Grant v. Readers Digest, 151 F.2d 733 (2nd Cir. 1945) cert. denied 326 U.S.
797 (1946) ; Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947). But the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania has apparently ignored this authority and the arguments adduced
therein. The recent case of McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Publishing Co.,
72 A.2d, 780 (1950), held that it was not libelous for defendant newspaper to
report falsely that plaintiff, a politician, had said "We all have to have a little com-
munism today." Deciding that the falsification was incapable of a defamatory mean-
ing the court went on: "To say a man is a communist or a socialist is not to defame
him . . . The platforms of neither of these parties advocate anything unlawful. The
Communist party claims that it is the only bona fide socialist party." The court also
cited with approval Sweeney v. Philadelphia Record Company, infra note 89, a case
which adopted the much criticised libel per se rule. For further discussion and
criticism of the McAndrew case, see comment infra this issue.
89. Compare Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 122 F.2d 288 (2nd Cir.
1941) (imputation of anti-semitism held libelous on motion to dismiss) with Sweeney
v. Philadelphia Record Co. 126 F.2d 53 (3rd Cir. 1942) (same imputation dismissed
as not libelous without proof of special damage). Here two courts analyzed the same
statement and arrived at totally different conclusions. The second circuit based
its opinion upon factors considered in this text supra; the third circuit deduced a
limited logical inference from the words and could find no damaging effect in them.
Cf. Christopher v. American News Co. 171 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1948) (imputation of
racial prejudice is libel).
the courts should work with the known fluctuations of community opinion,
the particular importance of some words in contenmporary life, and the
science of propaganda techniques. The testimony of public opinion experts
should be admitted and recognized as of some weight.90 This would be no
real departure. The law has always admitted evidence of the nature of
the plaintiff's standing in the community in order to test the inherent
capacity for damage in the alleged libel.91 If those external factors may
be introduced to place a statement in its proper context of community
significance, why not admit the analytical evidence of the scientist? An-
other consideration of value would be to take judicial notice of the pe-
culiar importance of some words when applied to particular groups.
For instance the falsification that a labor union is a "scab" or "yellow-
dog outfit" can have especial significance to that type of group. The use
of the words "heretical" or "Godless" when applied to a religious organi-
zation is also more meaningful, more injurious. 2 In the same way the
charge of communism is particularly hurtful to a political group, because
it has a more specialized and exact connotation when applied to a group
whose field of endeavor is public affairs. Lastly the courts should realize
that constant, wilful repetition of a normally inconsequential assertion
can tend to transform the statement into a highly damaging epithet.93 To
call the ADA a "bunch of quacks" once would do little harm, but to
hammer the words home day after day can have the definite effect of
stereotyping the group in the minds of a large community segment and
thus rendering it ineffective in its field of endeavor.94
Limitations as to Group.-Some courts and commentators have viewed
any expansion of the frontiers of actionable libel to include group suits
as an enveloping threat to civil liberty. The boundaries of this type of
action, they argue, are too vague. If it is a libel to smear the American
Legion, then why is it not a libel to smear "veterans" as a class? As soon
as a remedy is granted to one body of people, then another larger and
more nebulous collectivity will seek redress. The desire of every kind of
group for a remedy will result in serious curtailment of all public dis-
cussion, for any defamatory reference to some vague, general class of citi-
zens might be the basis of future litigation.9 5
90. Cf. United States v. Pelley 132 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1942). In this case, a
sedition trial, the testimony of propaganda experts was held admissible to show defend-
ant's statements could tend seriously to temoralize the war effort. It should be
noted that the testimony of public opinion experts also involves an interesting hearsay
problem.
91. McCoRmIcic, op. cit. supra note 78, § 119.
92. But cf. Creekmore v. Runnels 18, 224 S.W.2d 1007 (Mo. 1949) (not actionable
to impute that clergyman is "heretic").
93. Cf. Hallen, Excessive Publication in Defamation, 16 MINN. L. REv. 160
(1932) ; Jones, Interest and Duty in Relation ta Qualified Privilege, 22 MIcH. L. REV.
437 (1942).
94. Cf. LIPPMAN, PUBLIC OPINIoN 90-131 (1921) ; Hayakawa, General Semantics
and Propaganda, 3 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 197 (1939) for a discussion of the
evils of stereotyping in public affairs.
95. See Ryckman v. Delavan, 25 Wend. 186, 199 (N.Y. 1840) : "It is far better
for the public welfare that some consequential injury to an individual, arising from
the general censure of his profession, his party or his sect go without remedy, than
that free discussion . . . be checked." Cf. State v. Klapprott, 127 N.J.L. 395, 22
A.2d 877 (1941) (invalidating a statute making criminal the vilification of racial and
religious groups, partly on grounds that the scope of the statute was too vague).
For a discussion of the general criticism against group libel see Reisman, Democracy
and defamation, 42 CoL. L. Rxv. 727, 770-80 (1942). See authorities cited in note
14 supra.
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Yet this criticism fails to differentiate between the fundamental nature
of a formally organized group and an amorphous group. By recognizing
and maintaining that distinction, courts can prevent group libel from be-
coming ihe Frankenstein envisioned by its critics. As previously shown,
it is no deviation from the traditional concept of defamation to grant re-
covery to an organized entity which engages in specific activities. But it
would be a great departure to say that any class of citizens as a class, has
an inherent right to sue for defamation.u
Actionable libel depends upon the showing of damage to a vested in-
terest in reputation. 97 The words must also descend to particulars and
specifically point out the plaintiff whom they damage.98 An amorphous
class, as a group, lacks the community of interests, the integration of pur-
pose necessary to give it a proprietary interest in its own reputation. 91
An organized entity such as the American Bar Association can recover be-
cause its interest in reputation is analogous to that of any businessman,
but "lawyers" as a libeled class have not that entity interest in good name
which is an essential ingredient of the group plaintiff. Furthermore an
aspersion upon an amorphous group is not really directed at the group
as a unity, but rather it is vaguely intended to apply to the individuals
who compose that group.10 0 Though it may encompass all of these, still
it points to no one person in particular and thus lodges in no member a
particular right to sue, either for himself or for the class.101
There seems little basis to the fear, then, that the courts have not the
legal wherewithal to make the necessary distinction between a plaintiff
such as the National Association for Advancement of Colored People and
the plaintiff of a class action brought for Negroes. Only an integrated
group, which functions as an entity to accomplish defined purposes can
recover, and only when that entity as such has been damned. Thus limited
group libel should pose no threat.10 2 The protection of larger unintegrated
classes (especially religious and racial groups) is a different and difficult
undertaking; if it is to be secured at all, it can only be done by carefully
drawn criminal statutes. These must find some way to distinguish be-
tween socially dangerous vilification and mere unpleasant derogation.
0 3
May a Political Party Sue?-If the ADA may recover for libelous
smears, why not the Republican Party? Here perhaps is the most
formidable problem yet posed. Although never decided by the courts, it
is the opinion of this author that no libel action should or could be brought
in the name of an official political party or any official subdivision thereof.
A party is of a different character from a private political organi-
zation. It is truly a public institution: an electoral agent of the public at
96. See notes 12 and 13 supra.
97. See note 8 supra.
98. See notes 27, 28 and 29 mspra.
99. Cf. SEELMAN, op. cit. supra note 59, § 88.
100. SALAMOND, ToRTs 529 (7th ed. 1929). Cf. Kirkman v. Westchester News-
paper Inc. 261 App. Div. 181, 24 N.Y. Supp. 2d 860 (1st Dept. 1941) (Action lies
for defamation of Union) ; Noral v. Hearst Publications Inc., 40 Cal. App. 2d 348, 104
P.2d 860 (1940) (Action will not lie for one of class of defamed Union officers).
101. Cf. Giraud v. Beach, 3 E.D. Smith 337 (N.Y. 1854); (Defendant charged
that "one" of the members of volunteer fire company was a thief. All members sued
for libel on class. The complaint was dismissed because the court could find no
injury). See also SEELMAN, op. cit. supra note 59, §§ 98-104.
102. On when a group becomes an entity such as described See Berle, Enterprise
Entity Theory 47 COL. L. REV. 343 (1947).
103. See N.J. LAws 1935, c. 151. Group vilification statute declared invalid in
State v. Klapprott, stpra note 95. See Ind. Acts 1947, c. 56.
large, an indispensable medium for the selection of candidates, and the
dramatization of issues, and the formulation of political theories, as well
as a vast collectivity of voters. The men, measures and theories ad-
vocated by this group are always subject to ultimate censure at the polls
if they are not responsible to the public will.104 Because of this power
wielded by the citizenry over parties, the public has something akin to
a proprietary interest in the affairs of each party. Each citizen feels it is
his undefined right to aid or oppose, to exalt or blemish the name of these
electoral agents. Whether unfortunate or not, tradition demands the
damning of opposing political parties, and customarily the public accepts
that damning with a grain of salt. It is only when the vilification de-
scends to particular persons (at which point it becomes a tort upon the
individuals defamed) that the community regards it as objectionable.10 5
If Democrats could sue Republicans for each damaging falsification made
during a campaign, then every particularly hard fought election would
conceivably result in libel litigation. The trial of such suits might well
turn into a second forum for partisan campaigns; and it might be decided
more on the basis of judge and jury prejudices then the law of defama-
tion. Is there, then, any legal basis to distinguish between actions brought
by private organizations as opposed to those of political parties?
A suit brought simply for a libel of "the Republicans" could well be
dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff is no more than an amorphous
group. Such a libel is usually directed at no particular entity, but rather
at a segment of the American voting public.'0 6 Even when the words are
directed at "the Republican Party", they refer to a class with little formal
organization, or real integration of purpose. A party is composed of many
diffuse elements; its makeup is in a continual state of flux and if there
be some members to whom it represents a holy cause, there are others to
whom it is nothing but a momentary preference for voting affiliation.
10 7
As a procedural matter it is difficult to see how a suit could ever be brought
in the name of so nebulous and impersonal a body.10 8
More difficult is the problem presented by a libel directed specifically
at an organized unit within the party, for instance a libel of the Na-
tional Republican Committee. In this situation the words are directed at
a definite entity. Is it possible to make a distinction between this type
of political organization, and one such as the ADA?
Certainly no governmental body may sue for a civil libel.10 9 The
right to speak may never be curtailed by the government unless and until
a clear and present danger will arise from its exercise. This is the mean-
ing of the First Amendment as construed by the Supreme Court.110 To
allow the government to sue for every conceivable libel would make a
mockery of the spirit and substance of that constitutional safeguard. Hence,
except for sedition and criminal libel laws, there exists an absolute privi-
lege to defame the government. The same privilege exists also with re-
spect to states or municipal bodies, for the limitations of the first amend-
104. For general discussion see Starr, The Legal Status of Atwricaip Political
Parties, 34 Al!. POL. Sci. Rxv. 439 (1940).
105. Cf. Ryckman v. Delavan 25 Wend. 186 (1840) where the court said at 198,
"The politician who assails the opposite party . . . ought not to be held responsible
in private suits for the bold avowal of opinions true or false."
106. See note 100 supra.
107. See Berdahl, Party Membership in The United States, 36 Am. PoL. Sci. Rxv.
439 (1942).
108. See note 13 supra.
109. City of Chicago v. Tribune 307 Ill. 595, 139 N.E. 86 (1923) ; City of Albany
v. Meyer 99 Cal. App. 651, 279 Pac. 213 (1929).
110. See note 34 supra.
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ment are embodied in the fourteenth and thus apply with equal force to
them.
111
This absolute privilege should also be applicable to the defamation of
political parties and their component parts. To be sure there is a differ-
ence between the state and a party; as one court has put it: "parties are
political instrumentalities not governmental instrumentalities." 112 True
also the founding fathers never comprehended parties as an integral part
of our constitutional system. But they have now necessarily become so,
for they are indispensable machinery to the operation of our democracy.
The states, by constitutional or legislative proviso have recognized this
fact and have assumed the power to regulate every party, once its name is
placed on the ballot, once it assumes the status of an electoral agent.1 3
The innermost workings of parties can be subject to legal control: their
nominating conventions," 4 their primaries, and their county and state
committees may all be limited in what can or cannot be lawfully done."15
Nor may the party formally establish its own age or citizenship require-
ments for candidates for public office; it may not summarily discharge
without cause, a county committee member."16 Underlying these legal
restrictions, runs the thesis that because of their quasi governmental
character, parties must be responsible to the people and to traditional
quarantees of civil liberties for the people." 7 Recently the South Carolina
legislature, in an effort to secure "white" primaries, abolished all state
regulations governing the conduct of primaries and declared that all
such activity was the private concern of the party. This effort to exclude
negroes was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Such action
really constitutes "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
amounts to a denial by the state of equal protection of the laws." 3 The
import of that decision is that a political party is bound by the limitations
of the Fourteenth Amendment. If this be so the party must also be
bound by the First Amendment, since its provisions are incorporated in
the Fourteenth. Then both the party and all of its official subdivisions,
with respect to civil libel suits, should be subject to the same restrictions
as are the states-the absolute injunction of the First Amendment.
The Right of Retraction, a Proposed Limitation on Recovery.-As
has been suggested, the recovery of damages in libel can often depend on
the whims of jurors-upon such factors as whether the plaintiff has made
a favorable impression, whether the defendant's statements have been pre-
sented in their most unfavorable light. Too often a libel trial can be
turned into a contest between the parties to curry the jury's favor."19 In
111. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1945).
112. See Cunningham v. McDermott 277 S.W. 218, 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
113. See Starr, supra note 104, at 445.
114. See Cunningham v. McDermott, supra note 112.
115. E.g., People -ex rel. Coffey v. Democratic General Committee of Kings
County, 164 N.Y. 335, 58 N.E. 124 (1900).
116. Young v. Beckham, 115 Ky. 246, 72 S.W. 1092 (1903).
117. Cf., Smith v. Alwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) ; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S.
536 (1927).
118. Ibid; Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
875 (1948). In this last case, the legislature of South Carolina had formally declared
the Democratic Party to be a "private" not a "state" organization. For comment see
61 HARv. L. REV. 1247 (1948).
119. McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 78, § 120 has prepared a revealing chart
showing various awards for certain defamatory words. As the author himself con-
cludes, there is no real criterion upon which juries may consistently base their deter-
mination. See Hays, Book Review, 58 HARv. L. REv. 881, 884 (1945), "My own
experience is that the result in a libel case depends on whether or not the jury likes
the plaintiff."
cases involving political libel there is an especial danger of this, for the
issues to be tried may be matters upon which the jurors have well de-
veloped prejudices. A panel of believers in the Hearst press, for instance,
could have some difficulty in appreciating the damage of defamatory slurs
cast upon a left-wing political organization.
1 2 0
Furthermore damages cannot always rectify the harm done to the
plaintiff's reputation.121 When a group has been libeled, the consequences
of the injury to its reputation cannot really be reduced to dollars and
cents. True, if the defamation were serious it may lose substantially in
contributions and membership fees. True, also, it may be necessary to
spend a substantial sum in order to buy radio time or newspaper space
so as to rebut effectively the calumny. But the most serious loss-that
of public confidence in its integrity--cannot easily be restored by a pay-
ment of money.
It should be recognized that defamation is a unique branch of tort
law. The real purpose of the libel remedy is not only to restore pecuniary
loss to the plaintiff, but also to deter other would-be defamers, and to
allow innocent persons to clear their good name. 2 2  Thus it has been
recognized that a remedy providing not only compensation, but also a
full retraction by the defendant can often most effectively put right the
wrong wrought by a defamation. 2 3  Retraction not only can restore pub-
lic confidence in the victim of a vilification but it also should deter the
vilifier in the future, for to the defamer would fall the humiliation and
expense of providing for a full and fair public recanting.
Unfortunately the use of retraction has not been so widely employed
in this country as in others.' 2 4  Yet there is precedent enough to provide
an ample foundation for its further development. The Common Law
theory of pecuniary damages has always predicated the size of compen-
sation upon the degree of publicity given the defamer's statements.
125 Ex-
cessive and widespread publication of the falsification may raise the figure
of damages. Proof, on the other hand, that the offending statements
reached only a narrow audience may mitigate the figure.1 26  A retrac-
tion has the effect of diminishing the number of persons influenced by the
original libel, and thus lessens its harmful effect.' 27
120. Cf., Townshend v. Hughes, 2 Mod. 150, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (1677) (Verdict
of £4,000 for the plaintiff). "They [jurors] gave such great damages to the plaintiff
(not that he was damnified so much) but that he might have the greater opportunity
to show himself noble in remitting them."
121. The well known words of Shakespeare perhaps best express the idea:
"Who steals my purse steals trash; tis something, nothing;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed."
122. Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 IL. L. REv. 36, 46
et seq. (1937).
123. See Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Proposals for Reform, 33 MINN. L.
Rzv. 609 (1949); Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for
Libel, 34 Vi. L. REv. 867 (1948).
124. See CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 161-195 (1947).
125. McCo~iucx, op. cit. mspra note 78, § 117.
126. Ibid; NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL § 1034 (3rd ed. 1914).
127. Cf., White v. Sun Publishing Co., 164 Ind. 426, 73 N.E. 890 (1905) (evidence
of a retraction is admissible and relevant to show mitigation of damages). But of
course, conversely, if the retraction is not published in a proper spirit, and is harmful
itself, it should be evidence of aggravation of damages. Cf., Luna v. Seattle Times
Co., 186 Wash. 618, 59 P.2d 753 (1936).
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Courts have admitted evidence of a retraction. If full and complete,
the retraction precludes recovery of punitive damages and may be shown
as a mitigation factor in the determination of general damages.128  A num-
ber of states have statutes which provide that when the defendant is a
newspaper, if full retraction be given prior to the trial this may be intro-
duced as evidence to mitigate damages.12 9  These statutes vary in form;
the common type simply provides that the defendant at his option may
retract, and, depending upon the publicity and completeness of the retrac-
tion, it may be considered as a factor by the jury in diminishing damages.130
Minnesota, however, provides that "in an action for.., a libel in a news-
paper, the plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages unless a
retraction be demanded and refused as here in after provided." 181 Neither
existing precedent nor existing statutes provide for retraction as an alterna-
tive form of relief after judgment has been given on the merits of the case.
Yet many a libel defendant would presumably be unwilling to consider a
retraction until after a jury has found that his allegedly defamatory remarks
actually did constitute a defamation. Thus if retraction is really to be made
effective, the plaintiff should have the opportunity to renew his demand,
after a successful trial of the merit of the case. In this way, retraction
could really be utilized as a remedy for defamation.
Are there any practical difficulties confronting this suggestion? It
may be argued that it is impossible to establish definite criteria for the
sufficiency of a retraction. Furthermore, experience has shown that some
retractions when artfully phrased, can by the use of subtle sarcasm be as
libelous as the original publication. 32  Lastly it may be said that people
will not believe the retraction if they know it was published under the
duress of avoiding a heavy payment of damages. 13 3
These arguments are of some merit when applied to the ordinary libel
suit between private individuals. But in cases of political libel there is a
more urgent need of speedy retraction. Without public vindication the
candidate or the organization has lost that which is most important to his
success-community confidence.18 4 Without a public retraction such plain-
tiffs would not usually receive publicity for a vindication. This is so be-
cause the press seldom gives much space to libel suits; journals are
naturally wary of the law of defamation and hence naturally reluctant to
128. Kehoe v. New York Tribune Co., 229 App. Div. 220, 241 N.Y. Supp. 676
(1st Dep't 1930).
129. E.g., CA.IF. CiV. CODE §48(a) (1941) (defendant at option can retract;
this may mitigate punitive damages, but only if publication made without malice);
Del. Laws 1943, c. 177, § 1 (plaintiff may specify defamatory statements and give
newspaper an opportunity to retract; retraction mitigates only punitive damages);
Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.050 (1946) (defendant may at his option publish two successive
retractions; if this is done, plaintiff may only recover "actual' damages) ; MAss. ANN.
LAws c. 231, § 93 (Supp. 1948) (defendant may offer to retract; this and satis-
factory retraction restricts plaintiff to recovery of "actual" damages). N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2.59-2 (1939) (Defendant may retract after request by plaintiff, in which
case plaintiff may only recover special damages). New York and Pennsylvania have
no statutes. Nevada has a statute which allows the plaintiff the right to reply, free
of cost. NEv. ComP. LAws ANN. § 10506 (1929).
130. E.g., CALIF. CIV. CODE § 48(a) (1941); Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.050 (1946);
MAss. ANN. LAws c. 231, § 93 (Supp. 1948).
131. MINN. STAT. § 548.06 (Henderson 1945) (Emphasis added).
132. E.g., Luna v. Seattle Times Co., 186 Wash. 618, 59 P.2d 753 (1936).
133. CHAFEE, op. cit. .wpra note 125 at 180-83; WITTENBERG, DANGEROUS WORDS
177 (1947).
134. See, e.g., the Minnesota retraction statute, mipra note 131, which has special
provisions for a retraction when the plaintiff is a political candidate.
discuss its uses in daily life.'3 5 There is another reason why retraction is
a more complete remedy in political libel. The plaintiff who sues just for
the purpose of getting a retraction is likely to stand in a more favorable
light than he who sues for damages. The public is less apt to misinterpret
his motives by forming the suspicion that the plaintiff is simply out for
some easy money.13 6 Also it should be noted that there need not be any
overpowering administrative burden in determining the criteria necessary
for a full and fair retraction. If the same publicity and the same space be
given to the retraction as was given to the libel, the plaintiff's loss will be
immeasurably restored.137 In political libel, furthermore, a public recanting
by the vilifier is more likely to be believed by the public, for it is well
known that no politician likes to "eat crow" unless he has to. Lastly, and
perhaps most important, the public has been given a chance to learn the
truth about the defamed party, and this is of the essence in the area of
political affairs.
In suits by political organizations, then, the plaintiff should have the
privilege of demanding a retraction as part of its relief. In lieu of punitive
damages and in diminution of general damages the defendant could exercise
his option to retract. Awarding such relief would be no real departure.
-As shown before, a retraction made prior to the institution of the suit can
provide grounds for precluding punitive damages and lessening general
damages.138 The same should be equally true of a retraction made after
a decision by the jury that the alleged libel was in fact a defamation. Thus
plaintflf should be permitted and encouraged to seek retraction as a remedy
in the alternative of high damages.13 9 Lastly, retraction rather than com-
pensation gives the vilified group a chance to redeem itself in the com-
munity's confidence, and thus the chance to state effectively, its case to the
public. A fair hearing is necessary if there is to be a constant competition
of ideas in our free society.'
40
CONCLUSION
The grim panorama of events during the last two decades has served
to awaken the social conscience of many; thinking citizens in greater num-
bers are endeavoring to partake in the shaping of public affairs. Concerted
action, through the medium of the group, provides to most the only effective
means of participation. World Federalism, Civil Rights-these are only a
few of the increasingly successful causes which have been nurtured through
the workings of collective advocacy. There is likelihood of the further
development of the group as a technique of expression in the field of
politics.141 That these organizations need legal status in the law of libel
135. The Minnesota Statute, supra note 131, also spells out in detail the req-
uisites of a full and fair retraction. Certainly the determination of whether a re-
traction was complete should be no harder than many other necessary determinations
in libel law, e.g., the measure of damages, the presence or absence of malice in the
plaintiff. Cf., Storey v. Wallace, 60 Ill. 51 (1871).
136. For discussion of the hostility of the average libel plaintiff see Donnelly,
The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 Via. L. Rav. 867, 872-
84 (1948); Reismann, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Gane and Fair Comment
II, 42 CoL. L. REv. 1282. 1284-85 (1942).
137. Cf., Webb v. Call Publishing Co., 173 Wis. 45, 180 N.W. 263 (1920) (hold-
ing that retraction was admissible to reduce general damages). See McCoRicic, op.
cit. szpra note 78 at 438.
138. Kehoe v. New York Tribune Co., 229 App. Div. 220, 241 N.Y. Supp. 676 (1st
Dep't 1930).
139. Cf., Reisman, smpra note 136, at 1315.
140. See note 24 supra.
141. For a history of the phenomenal growth of groups in this countiv see
SCHLESINGER, PATHS TO THE PRESENT 23-51 (1949).
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is becoming clear. It is too easy for the unchecked vilifier to distort their
purposes and subvert their efforts.
There is a precedent available upon which may be founded remedies
to protect the political group, while still preserving a maximum of free
debate. It is possible for courts to limit the scope of group libel, to extend
a right of action to the well organized entity while denying relief to vague
classes of citizens. The existing rules of privilege should secure ample
freedom for responsible criticism. By judicious and realistic appraisal of
a given falsification, the courts can distinguish between verbal attacks
which are trivial and those which are socially dangerous. This method,
rather than the use of such antiqudted devices as the libel per se doctrine,
should prove more efficient to differentiate between the deserving and the
undeserving plaintiff. And as a method of counteracting vicious calumny,
it is suggested that the seldom used remedy of retraction can prove more
beneficial both to the group plaintiff and to the community than merely the
payment of monetary damages. Developed along these lines, group libel
can be of service to democracy.
J.C.N.P.
The Courts and the Federal Tort Claims Act
On August 2, 1946 with the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act 1
the United States became amenable to suits in tort. By this legislation the
ancient doctrine of the immunity of the sovereign to suit, already partially
destroyed by the invasions of the Tucker Act of 1887 2, the Patent In-
fringement Act of 1910 8, the Suits in Admiralty Act of 1920 ', the Public
Vessels Act of 1925 1, and the Oyster Bed Damage Act of 1935 6, was al-
most completely swept away, its only surviving vestiges being those ex-
pressly set forth in the Act itself.7 This event was the culmination of
twenty-odd years of legislative effort. Congress had from the first recog-
nized the existence of a moral obligation to recompense those injured by
the wrongful acts of government servants and might, if petitioned, discharge
that obligation by granting appropriate relief through the medium of a
private bill. But such relief was always granted as a matter of grace and
not as one of right. As the country grew industrially and commercially
and governmental activities necessarily became more diversified and com-
plex, the number of injuries occasioned thereby mounted steadily, as did
the number of petitioners seeking relief from what they hoped would be a
benevolent Congress. It was then that those who had been attacking the
basic injustice of the antiquated doctrine of sovereign immunity began to
find receptive listeners among the members of Congress and the forerunners
1. 60 STAT. 843 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (Supp. 1948). New Title: 62
STAT. 992, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-
2680 (1948). Hereinafter referred to as the Act. For detailed analysis of the terms
of the Act see Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation,
35 GEo. L.J. 1 (1946) and Note 42 ILL. L. Rav. 344 (1947).
2. 24 STAT. 505 (1887), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2) (1948).
3. 36 STAT. 851 (1910), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1948).
4. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §742 (1946).
5. 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §781 (1946).
6. 49 STAT. 1049 (1935), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1497 (1948).
7. See note 148 infra for the exceptions to the Act.
of the Act began to make their appearance.8 Between 1924 and 1946 no
less than eighteen different versions of a tort claims act were introduced in
Congress and in 1928 such an act was actually passed but died on the desk
of President Coolidge.
The heart of the Act is to be found in the provision that the Govern-
ment shall be liable, for money damages only, for any
"injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death, caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
government while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred." 0
Jurisdiction is given to the district court of either the district where the act
complained of occurred or the district wherein the plaintiff resides 10 to
hear the case without a jury." The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
applicable and the Government may assert any rights of set-off or counter-
claim existing in its favor against the plaintiff at commencement of the
action.' 2  The claim is forever barred unless brought within one year after
accrual of the right of action 13 and final judgment bars any action by the
same claimant against the employee-tortfeasor.' 4 The remedy provided by
the Act is exclusive and suit against a federal agency in its own name is
denied as to claims falling within its provisions.' 5 Twelve classes of claims
are specifically excluded from the waiver of immunity to suit.16 Federal
agencies are authorized to make administrative settlement of claims for
$1,000 or less.1
7
These provisions have now been the subject of judicial interpretation
and application for over three years. It is the purpose of this Note to set
forth the case law on the Federal Tort Claims Act which has developed
during this period.' 8
THE CAUSE OF AcTION
Liability under the Act must first of all be based upon "injury or loss
of property, or personal injury or death." 19 The language is clear and
poses no substantial problem of construction. Under this provision a
claim against the Government for the alleged non-permissive use of a non-
8. For comprehensive discussions of the theory of immunity and the growth of
opposition thereto see: Holtzhoff, Tort Clains Against the United States, 25 A.B.A.J.
828 (1939) ; Anderson, Tort and Implied Contract Liability of thre Federal Govern-
m-ent, 30 MINN. L. REV. 133 (1946); Borchard, Tort Claims Against the Govern-
inent, 33 A.B.A.J. 221 (1947) ; Gelhorn and Schenck, Tort Actions Against the
Govemment, 47 CoL. L. REv. 722 (1947); Walkup, Immunity of the State From
Tort By Its Citizens-Toward a More Enlightened Concept, 36 Geo. L.J. 310 (1948).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1948).
10. 28 U. S. C. § 1402(b) (1948).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1948).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(c) (1948).
13. 28 U.S.C. §2401(b) (1948).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1948).
15. 28 U.S.C. §2672 (1948).
16. 28 U.S.C. §2680 (1948). See note 148 infra.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1948). For a discussion of settlement procedure see
Walker, Administrative Settlement of Claims Under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
9 OHIO ST. L.T. 445 (1948).
18. This Note includes all cases reported through April 3, 1950.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1948).
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patented bombsight method has been dismisse. 20 It has also been invoked
to defeat an attempt to avoid the limitation period of the Act. A bus
passenger was injured in a collision with an army truck in 1943. After
passage of the Act, the bus company voluntarily settled with the injured
party and then sued the Government to obtain full contribution under the
local statute. The claim was dismissed as arising from the settlement and
not from the injury.2 ' Similarly, where a bus company, being sued by a
passenger injured in a like collision, sought to implead the United States
as a joint tortfeasor, the third-party complaint was dismissed on the ground
that a claim for contribution is not a claim for money damages for personal
injury or death but is rather an equitable claim for payment of a propor-
tionate part of the claimant's liability for damages to a third person.
22
To be actionable the injury must be caused by an "employee of the
government while acting within the scope of his office or employment." 23
With respect to civilian employees, the courts have experienced little dif-
ficulty in construing this language in accordance with such well established
master and servant doctrines as those of "frolic or detour," 24 "borrowed
servant," 25 "independent contractor," 26 and "joint adventure." 27 For
the purposes of the Act, service personnel are within the scope of employ-
ment when "acting in line of duty." 28 The courts, with substantial una-
nimity, have rejected the contention that this phrase should receive the
same interpretation as it does in various service regulations and thus include
acts which would not be within the scope of employment if performed by a
civilian employee. This is best illustrated by Campbell v. United States 
2 9
in which an elderly woman sought to recover damages for injuries received
when she was knocked down by a sailor running to catch a departing troop
train. The sailor was one of a large contingent being transported by the
navy to a new base and had left the train without permission at a one hour
stopover. The district court based liability upon the fact that he was
traveling under competent orders under direct government supervision and
was duty bound to catch the train, saying that the contruction of "line of
duty" "should be reasonably strict but yet not so strict as to make the Act
20. Fulmer v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 137 (N.D. Ala. 1949). The plaintiff
was defeated by his inability under existing statutes to first prove the existence of a
property right by suit against the Government.
21. Oahu Ry. & Land Co. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 707 (D. Hawaii 1947).
22. Stradley v. Capital Transit Co., 87 F. Supp. 94 (D.C. 1949).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1948).
24. Wibye v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1949) (Choice of
routes which added 60 miles to a 900 mile trip held merely a slight deviation);
Lowe v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (Driver of army car had
returned from "frolic"); Long v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 35 (S.D. Cal. 1948)
(Deviation of 20 miles from prescribed route placed driver outside the scope of his
employment).
25. Sanchez v. United States, 177 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1949) (Atomic Energy
Commission loaned car to assist in state-directed search for missing child. Member
of Security Service Guard volunteered to drive. Control over driver held to be in
state officers); Fries v. United States. 170 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1948), afflrmilnq, 76
F. Supp. 396 (W.D. Ky. 1948) (United States Public Health Service loaned car
and driver to county venereal disease survey. Driver held to be servant of county).
26. State of Md. v. Manor Real Estate and Trust Co.. 176 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.
1949) (Rental agent for F.H.A.-owned apartmpnt house held not to be an inde-
pendent contractor) ; Hood v. Defense Homes Corp.. 83 F. Supp. 365 (D.C. 1949)
(Manager of apartment house owned by Government-owned corporation held to be
an independent contractor).
27. Fries v. United States, 170 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1948).
28. 28 U.S.C. §2671 (1948).
29. 75 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1948).
practically inapplicable, and, consequently, meaningless." 36 The circuit
court reversed the judgment on the ground that the phrase does not establish
absolute liability for all actions in line of duty and that the ordinary prin-
ciples of respondeat superior remain the measure of liability.8 1 The court
was of the opinion that Congress could not have intended to establish two
inconsistent meanings of scope of employment, one for civilians and the
other for servicemen, but, to the contrary, intended to make the Govern-
ment liable "under the same circumstances and no other, as those under
which private persons would be liable for the acts of their employees ac-
cording to the law of the place where the injury occurred." 32 The same
principle was applied where the claim was based upon physical disability of
a civilian employee of an army hospital resulting from elective surgery
performed in the hospital by army doctors after the claimant had been ad-
mitted as a patient by order of the hospital commandant. The complaint
was dismissed, the court holding that, even assuming actionable negligence
in the surgery, the initial act of admitting the patient to the hospital was
not in line of duty, being beyond the authorized power of the commandant. 33
Where the alleged wrongful acts were those of army personnel assigned to
duty as R.O.T.C. instructors at a private military academy, the court was
sufficiently troubled by the "line of duty" provision to deny the motion of
the Government for summary judgment.s However, it found no difficulty,
upon trial of the case, in holding that the facts showed that the servicemen
were acting as the borrowed servants of the academy at the time of the
accident and not as employees of the Government.35 In several motor
vehicle cases, the courts have held that the mere fact that a serviceman was
driving a properly dispatched government-owned vehicle at the time of the
accident does not place the wrongful act within the scope of employment.36
But where the solder-driver was authorized to transport a group of soldiers
to a certain town for recreational purposes, and, after his passengers were
unloaded, used the truck for a private excursion within the town with an-
other soldier and two young ladies, it was held that the authorized use
extended to the recreation of one man as well as to the group and that his
30. Id. at 183.
31. United States v. Campbell, 172 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 957 (1949).
32. Id. at 503; accord, United States v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914, 918 (4th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 517 (1950), "The words of the statute relied upon
by the plaintiff were doubtless used because it was felt that as to military and naval
personnel, 'line of duty' more correctly described action representing the government
than 'scope of employment.'" See also King v. United States, 178 F.2d 320 (5th
Cir. 1949), holding that an air cadet making a midnight flight while intoxicated and
without the authorization, consent or knowledge of anyone acting in line of duty
for the United States was not, himself, acting in line of duty.
33. Cannon v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 1949), at 882, "The
Uffited States can be bound only by agents acting within the scope of the authority
delegated to them."
34. Cobb v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 713 (W.D. La. 1947).
35. Cobb v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. La. 1948).
36. E.g., Hubsch v. United States, 174 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1949), r'-vd on other
grounds, 70 Sup. Ct. 225 (1950), at 9, "We must reject the contention that judg-
ment can be fastened upon the United States under the FTCA solely because a
servant of the Government negligently drove a vehicle belonging to the Govern-
ment which had theretofore been entrusted to such servant, without regard to whether
such servant was acting within the scope of his duty."; Cropper v. United States,
81 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Fla. 1948) (Collision while returning from "frolic");
Murphey v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1948), rv'd on issue of
fact, 179 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950), (Pedestrian killed by driver on "frolic"),
at 929, "The act to be one in line of duty must have relation to causation, mediate
or immediate, to the duty owed by the actor."
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excursion was an "anticipated incidental act" which his superiors should
have foreseen and hence was within the line of duty. 7  However, where a
naval officer negligently caused a collision while driving his private car, the
mere fact that he was returning to his home after making an official re-
cruiting broadcast did not make the trip one within the scope of his employ-
ment.3 8 Nor was a marine officer acting within the scope of his employ-
ment while driving his private car to a new station under orders which
recompensed him for traveling expenses but which left him free to choose
any method of transportation. The court held that he was not acting as an
officer but for his own use and benefit and was subject, while driving, to
the control of no one but himself, with the result that the master-servant
relation did not exist in respect to the transaction out of which the injury
arose.3 9 A different problem has arisen where the government vehicle
was being properly used for official purposes but the particular driver at
the time of the accident was not authorized. Here the accident has been
held to be within the scope of employment. One court reached this result
by holding that the non-authorized driver was the agent of the assigned
driver who was negligent in not exercising the proper degree of control
over his substitute. 40 Another court merely said that it was immaterial
whether the particular driver was authorized to drive so long as the vehicle
was being used on official business.41
In only a few cases has the question been raised as to whether the tort-
feasor was an employee of the Government, apart from the question of
whether he was acting in the scope of his employment. It has been held that
neither a district court judge nor the trustee in bankruptcy appointed by
him is an employee of the United States so as to permit suit under the Act
based upon their allegedly tortious conduct in a bankruptcy cause.42 Potato
inspectors hired by a county agricultural association as a condition of loans
received from the Government under the price support program were held
not to be employees of the United States even though their fees were paid
by the Government and then added to the borrower's indebtedness which
would not become due unless prices rose above the fixed minimum. The
court pointed out that although the program required the organization of
county associations and the hiring of approved inspectors, the Department
of Agriculture could neither select nor discharge either the association
officials or the inspectors and hence had no right of control.
43
Claimants have unsuccessfully attempted to construe the "law of the
place" provision of the Act so as to modify "scope of employment". The
outstanding example has been the attempt to invoke the permissive use
statutes of various states in order to create a presumption of use within the
scope of employment and thereby place upon the Government the burden
37. Murphey v. United States, 179 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950). There was a
strong dissent, at 746, to the effect that individual diversions are not duties and that
the driver's conduct, if placed in a civilian background, would clearly not be within
the scope of employment.
38. Rutherford v. United States, 73 F.Supp. 867 (N.D. Tenn. 1947).
39. United States v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 70
Sup. Ci. 517 (1950).
40. Siciliano v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1949) (Driver of navy
jeep allowed sailor-hitchhiker to drive).
41. Clemens v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 463 (D. Minn. 1949) (Army military
police patrol car made authorized trip with a non-authorized driver).
42. Crdmelin v. United States, 177 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1949). The court pointed
out that the plaintiff's remedy was by way of appeal and not by suit in tort.
43. Lavitt v. United States, 177 F.2d 627 (2nd Cir. 1949), acriing, 87 F. Supp.
149 (D. Conn. 1948) (Warehouse burned due to negligence of inspectors).
of disproving such use.44  Such attempts have all met with failure, the
courts holding that the Government has waived its immunity only as to
claims falling squarely within the four corners of the Act and that local
law cannot be applied to extend the waiver but becomes applicable only
after "scope of employment" is established independently of local law.
45
Given an injury caused by an employee acting within the scope of his
employment, the claimant must then show that the injury was caused by a
"negligent act or omission . . . under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 46 The
tendency has been to interpret this language in accordance with the principle
that statutes waiving immunity to suit are to be construed not only strictly
in favor of the Government, but narrowly and literally.47  However, the
fact that liability is determined initially, in the particular case, by a state
administrative agency does not exclude the claim. Such a situation arose
where a government employee who had contracted pulmonary tuberculosis
from constant exposure to the elements brought suit under the Act, alleging
that the exposure was due to the negligence of his superiors. The Govern-
ment's motion for dismissal was overruled, the court holding that so long
as the liability in tort of the employer existed under the laws of the state
it was immaterial that an administrative agency initially passed upon the
merits of the claim.48 In at least one case the claimant has been permitted
to waive assumpsit and sue in tort under the Act. In that case surplus war
materials purchased from the Government had arrived at destination in a
badly damaged condition due to improper loading and bracing. The claim-
ant's contract of purchase had provided for the Government to load and
ship but the circuit court held that this gave rise not to a specific promise
to load carefully but to an implied obligation to do so, the breach of which
gave rise to an action in tort.49 The phrase "wrongful act or omission" has
also been extended to include the refusal of Department of the Interior em-
ployees to take up and cancel grazing permits for federal lands which con-
flicted with a subsequent grant to the claimant of exclusive grazing privi-
leges.50
As in ordinary tort litigation between private persons, the bulk of the
suits under the Act have been automobile negligence cases. Here, the
courts have been quick to apply the statutory rules of negligence of the
44. See cases cited in note 36 supra.
45. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Campbell case, note 31 supra,
despite the claimant's contention that under Louisiana law the fact that the tortfeasor
was wearing a uniform was prima facie evidence that he was acting within the scope
of his employment.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1948). The failure to tie the claim to a specific act or
omission constituting a breach of a duty owed to the claimant is fatal. E.g.,
Schmidt v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 496 (D. Kan. 1949), aff'd, 179 F.2d 724 (10th
Cir. 1950); Johnson v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 134 (E.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd, 168
F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Lundy v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Fla. 1948).
But cf. Beasley v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
47. E.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); United States v.
Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940) ; Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894).
48. Henson v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Mo. 1949). The court in-
dicated that the claimant could elect to proceed either under the Federal Employees
Compensation Act without regard to negligence or under the Tort Claims Act and
assume the burden of proving negligence.
49. United States v. Scrinopskie, 179 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1950).
50. Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738 (10th Cir. 1949).
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particular states.51 Statutory standards of due care have also been relied
upon to determine negligence in claims arising from plane crashes and col-
lisions at sea.52 The local application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
has been invoked to shift the burden of disproving negligence to the Govern-
ment in the case of an unexplained plane crash 58 and where an improperly
filled medical prescription resulted in death. 54  Claimants have also been
permitted to rely upon local presumptions such as the one that, absent proof
to the contrary, a deceased person is presumed to have attempted to avoid
death and, therefore, cannot have been guilty of contributory negligence at
the moment of a fatal accident. 55 Further, where a fourteen year old boy
was killed when a guard at a naval base accidentally discharged a pistol
while unloading it, the Government was absolved of liability by the applica-
tion of the Maryland doctrine that an occupier of land owes no duty of
care to avoid injury to a licensee unless he has knowledge that the latter
is in peril.56
In a pair of cases decided upon Florida law, the doctrine of "last clear
chance" was rejected in one and applied in the other, both cases resulting
in government liability. In the former, a Government car, driving through
a red light, struck a motorcycle. The court rejected the contention that the
failure of the claimant to take the last clear chance to avoid the accident
barred his recovery, holding that he had the right to proceed in reliance
upon his right of way.57 In the other case, the claimant's decedent had
stopped his truck at night on the wrong side of the road with bright lights
facing oncoming traffic. The driver of an approaching navy truck was
blinded by the glare and drove into the parked truck. Both drivers were
guilty of statutory violations but the court held that the navy truck had the
last clear chance to avoid the collision and, therefore, the contributory
negligence of the truck driver did not defeat the claim.55
51. E.g., Maragakis v. United States, 172 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1949) (Utah
assured clear distance rule); Spell v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Fla.
1947) (assured clear distance rule) ; Creal v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 249 (W.D.
Ky. 1949) (Speeding and ignoring stop sign); Potts v. United States, 78 F. Supp.
833 (W.D. Ky. 1948) (emergency vehicle right of way) ; Parmiter v. United States,
75 F. Supp. 823 (D. Mass. 1948) (failure to keep to right and observe conditions
of the road); McMullan v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1947)
(emergency vehicle right of way); Washabaugh v. United States. 83 F. Supp. 623
(M.D. Pa. 1949) (passing through red light); Visokay v. United States, 83 F.
Supp. 367 (W.D. Pa. 1949) (pedestrian right of way); Carroll v. United States,
87 F. Supp. 721 (W.D.S.C. 1949) (Grade-crossing signals).
52. Brouse v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (army fighter
plane flying on automatic pilot collided with private plane as result of not maintaining
proper lookout in accordance with C.A.A. regulations) ; Corkran v. United States, 79
F. Supp. 222 (S.D. W.Va. 1948) (C.A.A. rules of right of way while landing) ; South
Carolina State Highway Dept. v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 598 (E.D.S.C.), aff'd,
171 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1948) (night mate on duty in excess of statutory period).
53. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. United States, 173 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1949)
(reversing a holding that res ipsa was inapplicable).
54. Wilscam v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 581 (D. Hawaii 1948) (navy phar-
macy negligently supplied a 30% atropine solution when the prescription was for /2%).
55. Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948) (mail truck-
private car collision); MacHale v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 372 (W.D. Wash.
1948) (pedestrian killed by navy jeep).
56. Duff v. United States, 171 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1949).
57. Colerick v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Fla. 1948).
58. Barnett v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Fla. 1948). But see Madden
v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 41 (N.D. Fla. 1948) where the same court invoked
basic principles of causation to avoid a binding precedent that a child of tender years
cannot, as a matter of law, be guilty of contributory negligence.
The provision that lex loci delicti governs under the Act appears un-
mistakeably clear. However, there is one case on record in which the trial
court applied the law of the forum. A fatal accident occurred in Utah and
suit was brought in South Dakota. The district court applied the Wrongful
Death statute of the latter to deny recovery to the claimant, an alleged
adoptive parent. The circuit court found this clearly erroneous, saying:
"... the standards and tests of the state where the accident occurred con-
trolled on all questions of negligence and the nature and extent of recovery,
including the capacity and rights of the plaintiff and the liability of the
United States." 59 The Circuit Court for the Tenth Circuit was confronted
with the problem of deciding what substantive law should be applied to a
claim arising from an accident upon the Fort Sill Military Reservation
which was established prior to the formation of the state of Oklahoma and
hence is not within the principle of the Sadrakula case.60 It disposed of the
problem by citing United States v. Standard Oil Co.61 to the effect that
"a so-called field of federal common law was clearly recognized" and then
applying common law principles to fix negligence upon the Government.
6 2
In a case involving a very interesting fact situation, the Maryland law of
landlord and tenant was relied upon to hold the United States liable for
death caused by rat-borne endemic typhus, the court finding actionable
negligence in the failure of the Federal Housing Administration to make
repairs recommended by the federal and city public health authorities to
render the apartment house rat-proof and in failing to make adequate ar-
rangements for garbage disposal.0
The incorporation of the phrase "if a private person" in the Act has
been utilized to deny to the Government defenses not available to private
individuals in the particular states. Thus, where the negligence complained
of was that of a Veterans Administration physician, the court refused to
apply the Pennsylvania doctrine that respondeat superior does not apply to
agents of charitable institutions.6 4 Similarly, where an army guard wounded
a bystander while firing at a trespasser, the court denied the applicability
of the local doctrine that a municipality cannot be held liable for the tortious
acts of its police officers acting in line of duty, on the ground that the
doctrine is based upon sovereignty which the Act has expressly relinquished,
and that to exempt claims arising from activities of a sovereign nature
would make the Act a mere nullity.6
PARTIES TO THE ACTION
Parties Plaintiff.-Shortly after passage of the Act the question arose
as to whether armed forces personnel could submit claims thereunder. In
Jefferson v. United States an army veteran sought to recover damages for
59. Olson v. United States, 175 F.2d 510, 512 (8th Cir. 1949).
60. Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940). This case is normally cited
as authority for the proposition that when the federal government acquires territory
within a state, the state's laws affecting private rights, in existence at the time of the
surrender of sovereignty, continue in effect until abrogated.
61. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
62. United States v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 171 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1948), aff'd
on other grounds, 70 Sup. Ct. 207 (1949).
63. State of Md. v. Manor Real Estate and Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.
1949), reversing, 83 F. Supp. 91 (D. Md. 1949).
64. Perucki v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 34 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
65. Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948), at 833, "'private
person' . . . does not determine the relationship of the Government to its employees
but rather determines the relationship of the Government to third parties."
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physical disability resulting from negligent surgery in an army hospital
prior to his discharge. 6 The district court was sufficiently troubled by the
failure of Congress to include claims of servicemen among the specified
exceptions to the Act so that it overruled, without prejudice, the Govern-
ment's motion for dismissal.6 7  Upon trial of the case the complaint was
dismissed for want of jurisdiction over a claim based upon service-connected
disability caused by negligence of Government servants.6 8  The court found
an implied exclusion of such claims based upon the following points: 6 9
The primary purpose behind the Act was the desire of Congress to avoid
the task of passing upon private bills for redress and servicemen had not,
in the past, been among those petitioning for such relief; under the Act
the law of the state controls liability, but state statutes cannot control the
federal relationship between soldier and government; 70 service-connected
disabilities are compensated for by existing pension and retirement pro-
visions; the amendment to the Military Claims Act indicates a Congres-
sional intent to exclude soldiers as claimants. 71 However, the district
courts of New York and Montana found no such implied exception to the
Act. The New York case involved the fall of a soldier from an army-
operated bus in which he was riding as a passenger on a military reserva-
tion. The court summarily rejected the contention that soldiers are ex-
cluded from the Act, saying: ". . . at the time of his accident he was
merely a passenger in a bus operated by the War Department. The fact
that he was wearing his army uniform did not exclude him from his right
to sue." 72 The Montana court emphasized the fact that the Act specifically
lists servicemen as possible tortfeasors and even specifically defines "scope
of employment" with respect to them.73  The Brooks case settled the con-
troversy so far as non-service connected injuries are concerned. The two
Brooks brothers, while home on furlough from the army, were riding with
their father in his private car when it collided with an army truck. One
brother was killed and the other partially disabled. The trial court granted
recovery in both actions.7 4  The circuit court adopted the rationale of the
66. 74 F. Supp. 209 (D. M-d. 1947) (towel left within abdomen during surgery).
67. Id. at 216, the broad and comprehensive language of the Act should not be
narrowed by construction to exclude a case not included in the numerous specified
exceptions.
68. Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948).
69. Id. at 711, "It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that the mere literal
reading of particular words in an act can be narrowed by construction where, from
the whole subject matter of the particular act and its setting in the whole governmental
scheme, the court can see that the literal import of the phrase used is contrary to
established policy and would not accord with the real intention of Congress in passing
the act."
70. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947), "The scope,
nature, legal incidents, and consequences of the relations between persons in service
and the government are fundamentally derived from Federal sources and governed by
Federal authority."
71. 57 STAT. 372 (1943), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 223(b) (c) (Supp. 1948). The
amendment excluded cases arising out of injuries incident to army service.
72. Samson v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 406, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
73. Alansky v. Northwest Airlines Co., 77 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mont. 1948) (army
officer killed in crash of government-owned plane while being transported to dis-
charge point). But see Troyer v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. Mo. 1947)
for a statement that the Act does not authorize claims by one soldier based upon the
negligence of another.
74. Brooks v. United States, Civil No. 545, 546, 547, W.D.N.C., 1947.
Jefferson case and reversed the judgments.75 Judge Parker filed a vigorous
dissent, saying: "Legislation is a matter for Congress, not for the court;
and the language used by Congress clearly covers soldiers as well as civil-
ians .... It is not reasonable to assume that the claims of soldiers were
overlooked at a time when soldiers and their rights were so prominently in
the public mind, when prior proposed legislation dealt explicitly with that
matter, and when the Act itself repealed legislation under which limited
relief could be granted." 76 This dissent was subsequently vindicated when
the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court on the ground
that the Act indicates a complete lack of legislative intent to exclude sol-
diers as claimants. The maxim expressio unius est excusio alterius was
applied with respect to the specified exceptions to reach the conclusion that
"any claim" clearly includes those of soldiers. This conclusion was bol-
stered by the general temper of the nation with respect to servicemen at
the time of the enactment and by the fact that of the eighteen tort claim
bills introduced and rejected between 1925 and 1935 all but two specifically
denied recovery to service personnel.77 The court, however, wanted it
clearly understood that its decision applied only with respect to injuries
not incident to service, Justice Murphy saying: "Were the accident inci-
dent to the Brooks' service, a wholly different case would be presented.
We express no opinion as to it. . .. The Government's fears may have
point in reflecting congressional purpose to leave injuries incident to service
where they were, despite literal language and other considerations to the
contrary. The results may be so outlandish that even the factors we have
mentioned would not permit recovery." 7s The Second Circuit treated
this dictum as a tacit approval of the Jefferson case and affirmed the dis-
missal of a wrongful death action based upon the death of an army officer
in a fire in the quarters occupied by him on a military reservation."
The court went on to say that if Congress had thought the existing mili-
tary pension system inadequate to compensate for service-connected in-
juries it would have so indicated and that the failure to specifically
exclude soldiers as claimants is indicative of a belief that such exclusion
was unnecessary. The Fourth Circuit, in affirming the Jefferson case,
agreed with the foregoing and added the comment that military efficiency
and discipline would be seriously impaired if an injured soldier could at-
tribute his injury to the negligence of a superior officer and thus force the
civil courts to pass upon the propriety of military decisions.8 0 However,
the Tenth Circuit reached a contrary result in a case involving the death
of an army officer as a result of negligent surgery in an army hospital.8 '
The court adopted the general reasoning of the Supreme Court in the
Brooks case and disposed of the question raised by Justice Murphy's dictum
75. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), 58 YALE L.J. 615
(1949). That the court was not altogether convinced is indicated by its remark, at
842, that construction of the Act is difficult "due primarily to the inept draftsmanship
on the part of Congress in failing to make clear and express provisions as to soldiers
in the United States army."
76. Id. at 847.
77. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), 18 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 96.
78. Id. at 53.
79. Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. granted, 70 Sup.
Ct. 573 (1950).
80. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. granrted, 70
Sup. Ct. 562 (1950).
81. Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949) (reversing a dismissal
below). There was a strong dissent in favor of the result in the Jefferson case.
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with the remark that if the result be irrational the remedy is by way of
legislative action.
Analogous to claims by servicemen was the claim of a District of Co-
lumbia policeman who had been injured by a mail truck. His medical ex-
penses were paid from a Welfare Fund supported in part by federal appro-
priations and he had suffered neither loss of pay nor disability. The district
court denied him recovery on the ground that "those members of a class for
which a comprehensive system of compensation has been otherwise pro-
vided may not seek benefits under the Act." 82 The circuit court disagreed
and held that in principle the policeman was on an equal footing with the
claimants in the Brooks case and that his acceptance of benefits from the
Welfare Fund did not preclude recovery for damages under the Act. 3
The right of insurer-subrogees and indemnitors to maintain derivative
suits under the Act has been the subject of more judicial discussion than
any other one question. The early cases, which soon came to represent a
shrinking minority, denied such a right on the fundamental ground that
the relinquishment of immunity by the sovereign must be construed strictly
in its favor.8 4  However, only one later case was influenced to the same
result,85 and the overwhelming majority of the courts experienced little
difficulty in holding that neither the Act itself nor its legislative history
manifested an intent to exclude such actions.88 Because of the manifest
importance of the question the Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the issue.81 The subsequent opinion clearly established the right
of subrogees to bring suit in their own names under the Act. 8 The appli-
cation of the Anti-Assignment Act 8 9 to subrogated claims, which had
troubled the lower courts somewhat, was finally determined. The Govern-
ment contended that this statute, though not prohibiting the transfer of a
claimant's substantive rights to an insurer-subrogee, requires that suit be
maintained in the name of the original claimant so that the United States
may avail itself of its statutory rights with respect to venue and counter-
claim and setoff as against the injured party, and will not become involved
82. Wham v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 126 (D.C. 1948). The court expressed
no opinion as to the claimant's right of election of remedies.
83. Wham v. United States, 18 U.S.L. WE-x 2380 (C.A.D.C. Jan. 30, 1950).
The court disposed of the problem of whether the claimant's acceptance of benefits
was an election of remedies by indicating that the claims against the Welfare Fund
and under the Act were concurrent and consistent and either or both could be
prosecuted until full satisfaction was obtained.
84. E.g., Rusconi v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1947), revd sub
norn. Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1948), 6
WAsH. & LEE L. Rav. 109 (1949) ; Old Colony Ins. Co. v. United States, 74 F. Supp.
723 (S.D. Ohio 1947), rev'd, 168 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Bewick v. United States,
74 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Tex. 1947).
85. Cascade County v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 850 (D. Mont. 1948).
86. E.g., State Farm Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. United States, 172 F.2d 737
(1st Cir. 1949); United States v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 171 F.2d 893
(4th Cir. 1948); United States v. Hill, 174 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1949), 1 ALA. L. Rv.
308; Nat. American Fire Ins. Co. of Omaha v. United States, 171 F.2d 206 (9th Cir.
1948).
87. 336 U.S. 960 (1949). Certiorari was granted in the following cases: Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 170 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Yorkshire Ins.
Co. v. United States, 171 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Chicago, R.I. &
P. Ry., 171 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1948). These had all recognized the right of sub-
rogees to bring suit under the Act.
88. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 207 (1949).
89. 35 STAT. 411 (1908), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1946).
in litigation concerning the extent of the derivative rights.90 This conten-
tion was rejected because of the judicial history of the Anti-Assignment
Act and also because of affirmative indications of congressional intent that
subrogation claims should not be excluded from suit under the Tort Claims
Act in the name of the subrogee. The Supreme Court has uniformly held
that the Anti-Assignment Act applies only to voluntary transfers and not
to transfers by operation of law and has indicated affirmatively that the
purposes of the Anti-Assignment Act are not contravened by the latter.9 1
"The fact that some administrative problems may be the unintended by-
products of an involuntary assignment has not been thought to be an evil
within the scope of a statute aimed at fraud and harassment." 92 The
Court found four factors manifesting a legislative intent not to bar subroga-
tion claims: (1) Congress has consistently recognized the right of sub-
rogees under the Small Tort Claims Act of 1922 93 which permitted re-
covery "on account of damage to or loss of" property; (2) when Congress
has wished to exclude such claims, it has done so specifically as in foreign
claims legislation; 94 (3) the attention of Congress had been directed to
the fact that the Anti-Assignment Act has been construed as not forbidding
involuntary transfers; 5 (4) "The broad sweep of its (the Tort Claims
Act) language in assuming the liability of a private person, the purpose of
Congress to relieve itself of consideration of private claims, and the fact that
subrogation claims made up a substantial part of that burden are also per-
suasive that Congress did not intend that such claims should be barred" 16
Having disposed of the Anti-Assignment Act, the Court found no proce-
dural difficulties in requiring the United States to defend suits by subrogees
as though it were a private person, holding that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure furnish the Government with ample protection.97 It is to be
noted, however, that permitting subrogees to sue may result in the Govern-
ment being unable to assert counterclaims and offsets arising against the
original claimant from unrelated transactions, and being forced to defend
multiple actions on the same tort if some parties in interest should be out-
side the particular jurisdiction.
Parties Defendant.-The courts, when confronted with the problem
of deciding whether the Act permits joinder of joint tortfeasors as defend-
ants, have not reached a uniform result, being troubled by an apparent in-
90. In prior cases the Government had contended that the Anti-Assignment Act
was a complete bar to recovery by the subrogee. See cases cited in notes 86-89 supra.
As a practical matter eventual recovery by subrogees could not be defeated. For
examples of subterfuges to which subrogees could resort if the Government's con-
tention were sustained see Ins. Co. of North America v. United States, 76 F. Supp.
951 (E.D. Va. 1948). For a case in which such a device was employed see Augusta
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 170 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1948), in which the insurer-
subrogee took a loan receipt from the insured for the amount of the insurance pay-
ments, the loan to be repaid only from the proceeds of recovery from the Government.
91. E.g., Western Pac. Ry. v. United States, 268 U.S. 271 (1925); Seaboard
Airline R. Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 655 (1921); Price v. Forrest, 173 U.S.
410 (1899) ; Erwin v. United States, 97 U.S. 392 (1878).
92. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 207, 213 (1949).
93. 42 STAT. 1066 (1922): 31 U.S.C. § 215 (1946).
94. 57 STAT. 66 (1943), 31 U.S.C. § 224(d) (Supp. 1948), "including claims of
insured, but excluding claims of subrogees."
95. Hearings on H.R. 6442, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1942).
96. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 207, 215 (1949).
97. Under Rule 17(a) a partial subrogee could sue alone as a real party in interest
but the Government could, upon timely motion, compel joinder of the insured or other
subrogees as necessary parties under Rule 19(b) and additional parties could later
be joined, if necessary, under Rule 21.
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consistency in the Act. On the one side is the provision that the United
States shall be liable as an individual and that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure with their liberal provisions for joinder are applicable. Op-
posed to this is the requirement that trial is to be without a jury. In this
regard it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court, in interpreting another
statutory waiver of immunity, the Tucker Act,98 has denied the right to
join other defendants with the Government."9 The cases manifest a ten-
dency to avoid facing the issue directly and to find other grounds for de-
cision whenever possible. In the Englehardt case, 10 0 the Government suc-
cessfully objected to dismissal of the complaint against the joint tortfeasor
(not a federal employee) on the ground that it should not be denied the
benefit of the Maryland contribution statute. There happened to be diversity
of citizenship as between the claimant and the co-defendant and the court
summarily disposed of the jury question by having the claim against the
individual tried to a jury while it simultaneously tried the case against the
United States.101 In a subsequent case before the same court, the joinder
was justified merely on the basis of diversity with no mention of the indi-
vidual's right to a jury trial.10 2 The Englehardt case was later cited in
another jurisdiction as authority for denying a motion of the Government
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of misjoinder.10 3  In at least one
case, where an individual and the Government were joined as defendants,
the matter proceeded to judgment without the issue being raised.10 4 Op-
posed to this is a dismissal based on the bare assertion that the court has
no jurisdiction over a case in which the United States and an individual
are joined and that the plaintiff must make election as to defendants.1°5
Where the individual tortfeasor is a resident of the same state as the claim-
98. 24 STAT. 505 (1887), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1948).
99. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941), at 591, "The matter is not
one of procedure but of jurisdiction whose limits are marked by the Government's
consent to be sued. That consent may be conditioned, as we think it has been here,
on the restriction of the issues to be adjudicated in the suit, to those between the
claimant and the Government. The jurisdiction thus limited is unaffected by the
Rules of Civil Procedure which prescribe the methods by which the jurisdiction of
the Federal courts is to be exercised but do not enlarge that jurisdiction." (Emphasis
added.)
100. Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947), 35 GEo. L.J.
572.
101. The jury found for the plaintiff for $3,000 and the court found the Govern-
ment liable for the same amount. But what if the jury and the court had decided upon
different amounts? See Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), denying the power
of a federal judge to grant additur.
102. State of Md. v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 83 F. Supp. 91 (D. Md.
1949).
103. Bullock v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 445 (D.NJ. 1947) (The action
against the individual tortfeasor was subsequently dismissed for want of diversity).
104. Rivers v. Bauer, 79 F. Supp. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1948). The court was probably
of the opinion that it should not consider the matter .s'a sponte. But cf. Prechtl v.
United States, 84 F. Supp. 889 (W.D.N.Y. 1949) and Uarte v. United States, 7
F.R.D. 705 (S.D. Cal. 1948), where the court, on its own motion, struck the co-
defendants from the complaint.
105. Sappington v. Principe, 87 F. Supp. 357 (D.C. 1948). This case presents
an interesting sequence of events. The action was originally brought against the
Government employee and the individual. The plaintiff then joined the United
States which immediately moved to strike the demand of the former for a jury trial.
The motion was granted as to all parties and the plaintiff dismissed the complaint as
against the Government employee. Finally, the court dismissed the action for want
of jurisdiction. See also United States v. Scrinopskie, 179 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1950),
affirming the action of the district court in denying the motion of the Government for
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of misjoinder. The district court merely
dismissed as to the joint tortfeasor.
ant, the court finds no difficulty in dismissing for want of diversity of
citizenship.' 0 6 But where the individual sought to be joined is the employee
whose wrongful act is the basis of the suit, dismissal is based upon the pro-
vision of the Act that judgment in an action thereunder shall be a complete
bar to action against the employee, on the rationale that the provision
would be unnecessary if he could be made a party to the action.10 7 As to
contribution, the courts seem to feel that the right thereto can be asserted,
if at all, 10 only by the Government and not by a joint tortfeasor. 1 9  This
is in keeping with the doctrine laid down in a leading case under the Tucker
Act to the effect that: "It (the United States) is not to be embarrassed by
joining other litigants who may be entitled to jury trial, and whose lia-
bility must necessarily depend on different principles." 110 The same con-
siderations operate to prohibit joining the Government as a party defend-
ant in a suit instituted against another tortfeasor, even though the suit is
already properly within the federal courts."
Suit under the Act must be brought against the United States and
not against any of its agencies as such. Thus, where a contractor being
sued for the collapse of a building filed a third party complaint against the
District of Columbia for negligently issuing a building permit for defective
plans, the complaint was dismissed." 2  Similarly, if the injury complained
of was caused by employees of a Government-owned corporation, suit must
be brought against the United States and if the complaint names the cor-
poration as the defendant it will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction." 3
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
The few procedural problems which have confronted the courts in suits
under the Act have been disposed of with little difficulty. The cause of
action under the Act must be asserted as an original complaint and cannot
be raised by way of counterclaim in a suit by the Government against the
106. Wasserman v. Perugini, 173 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1949), at 306, "But the mere
assertion of a claim by plaintiffs against the United States is insufficient to create
jurisdiction over a separate claim against the individual defendants where there is no
diverse citizenship as between plaintiffs and those individuals." Accord, Dickens
v. Jackson, 71 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
107. Uarte v. United States, 7 F.R.D. 705 (S.D. Cal. 1948), 62 HARv. L. Rxv.
321 (1949); Prechtl v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 889 (W.D.N.Y. 1949).
108. It is highly questionable if the United States could join a joint tortfeasor as
an unwilling co-defendant without violating the latter's constitutional right to a jury
trial.
109. "Moreover, plaintiffs could not assert a claim against defendants having the
same citizenship irrespective of any right of contribution from such defendants which
the United States might possess," Wasserman v. Perugini, 173 F.2d 305, 306 (2d Cir.
1949). Accord, Stradley v. Capital Transit Co., 87 F. Supp. 94 (D.C. 1949) ; Drum-
mond v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Va. 1948).
110. Lynn v. United States, 110 F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 1940).
111. Donovan v. McKenna, 80 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass. 1948). In Newsum v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 79 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), defendant filed a third party
complaint against the United States and the latter's motion to dismiss was denied.
However, in that case the plaintiff was suing his employer under the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act and the latter was seeking indemnity from the Government.
112. Douffas v. Johnson, 83 F. Supp. 644 (D.C. 1949).
113. Wickman v. Inland Waterways Corp., 78 F. Supp. 284 (D. Minn. 1948).
But cf. Wagner v. Panama R. Co., 229 N.Y. 432, 87 N.E.2d 444 (1949) where, in a
suit under the Jones Act of 1920 against a Government-owned corporation for main-
tenance and cure and lamages for negligently caused injuries, the corporation's motion
for dismissal on the grounds of the Tort Claims Act was denied. The New York
court assumed that Congress could not have intended to deny to the plaintiff the
procedural advantages of the Jones Act, despite the fact that 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d),
while specifically excluding from the Tort Claims Act certain suits in admiralty
covered by other statutes, does not mention the Jones Act.
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would-be claimant, the Government having waived immunity only on its
own terms." 4 It is clear that the jurisdictional amount of $3,000.00 is not
a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction under the Act. To hold otherwise
would render meaningless the provision of the Act authorizing withdrawal
from an administrative agency of a claim for $1,000 or less and filing suit
for no greater amount. The power of Congress to thus bestow federal
jurisdiction irrespective of the amount in controversy cannot be disputed.1 5
Despite the fact that Rule 8 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
makes contributory negligence an affirmative defense, the courts have found
no inconsistency in applying local procedural rules placing upon the plain-
tiff the burden of proving the lack thereof." 6
The cases indicate a tendency to apply the Federal Rules rather strictly.
In Wu-nderley v. United States 17 the plaintiff filed interrogatories under
Rule 35 for official army reports concerning the accident at issue. The
Government's claim of privilege was rejected on the ground that the Act
placed the United States on a parity with private litigants and it was ordered
to either supply the reports or accept the procedural penalty under Rule 37.
Where the plaintiff served the United States with requests for admissions
under Rule 36(a) and the Government attorney responded with a denial,
which, through an oversight, was unsworn, the court held the denial to be
a nullity and treated the facts in question as admitted." 8 This policy has
also inured to the benefit of the Government, as where the court dismissed
a complaint which was received by the clerk of the court on the last day
of the one year limitation period but for which the filing fee was not received
until four days later."9 A contrary result was reached in another district
where the court permitted the plaintiff, who had filed a complaint which
sounded as a libel in admiralty, to later amend it, after the running of the
limitation period, to an action in tort under the Act. 2 0 The court was of
the opinion that the filing within the year of an action which named the
United States as a defendant and which sufficiently described the claim to
give notice thereof to the Government attorneys, satisfied the procedural
requirement.
AMOUNT OF RECOVERY AND RELATED MATTERS
As originally enacted the Act expressly excluded liability for punitive
damages.' 2 ' To remedy the inequity thus created with respect to Massa-
114. United States v. Pittsley, 86 F. Supp. 463 (D. Mass. 1949).
115. Bates v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 57 (D. Neb. 1948).
116. Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States, 172 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Marino
v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1949). This is in accordance with
sound conflict of laws principles. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943);
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWs 39 (3d ed. 1949).
117. 8 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
118. Beasley v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.S.C. 1948). The court
held that the plaintiff did not waive the defect by not raising the question before trial,
saying at 529, that the Government must suffer for the mistake of its attorney just
as it does for the tort of its servant. This appears to be at odds with the requirement
of FaD. R. Civ. P. 1 that "They (the rules) shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action" (emphasis added).
119. Turkett v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 769 (N.D.N.Y. 1948).
120. Bay State Crabmeat Co. v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 131 (D. Mass. 1948).
In Connor v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1949), in an analogous situa-
tion, the court indicated that the libellant could have amended his action to one for
maritime tort if the original libel had been filed within the limitation period.
121. But cf. Wilscam v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 581 (D. Hawaii 1948) in
which the court asserted that punitive damages are not assessable under the Act and
then awarded $10,000 to parents for loss of association of their deceased four year
old son.
chusetts and Alabama, whose wrongful death statutes are punitive in nature,
the Act was amended to provide that in such jurisdictions "the United
States shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by the
pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons, respectively,
for whose benefit the action was brought." 122 In the only case in which
this provision has been applied, the administratrix of an eighteen year old
boy was the plaintiff. The court applied the Alabama laws in respect to
distribution upon intestacy and found that the boy's grandparents were the
only eligible beneficiaries and that they had suffered no pecuniary loss.
Nominal damages of $1 were awarded.1
23
The amount of recovery is not to be diminished by any benefits which
the claimant may have received in the way of insurance payments. This has
clearly been settled by the so-called subrogation cases.1
24  It is equally well
settled that a claimant will be denied double recovery from the Government
in that the award will be diminished by any payment or other benefit of
monetary value received from any Government source. Thus, in the Brooks
case, recovery was diminished, in the case of the injured soldier, to the
extent of the wages paid and medical treatment furnished by the army after
the injury plus the value of future benefits to be received through the
Veterans Administration, and, in respect to the deceased soldier, by the
amount of the death gratuity paid by the army to the parents.125 Similarly,
where a governmental agency has paid the injured person's hospital bill,
the recovery will be diminished pro tanto,128 and compensation received
under the Federal Employees Compensation Act will also be deducted.
1 27
There is not the same unanimity with respect to the question of
whether such recovery aliunde is an election of remedies so as to bar any
further recovery under the Act. A district court has held that the accept-
ance of compensation under the Federal Employees Compensation Act prior
to the enactment of the Tort Claims Act could not be an election as the
claimant did not have, at any one time, a choice of remedies.'2 8 But where
an employee applied for and received compensation under the Federal Em-
ployees Compensation Act prior to the passage of the Tort Claims Act and
continued to accept such payments for ten months thereafter, the circuit
court held that the continued receipt of such payments constituted an elec-
tion and barred recovery under the Tort Claims Act.
129
With respect to the effect of prior settlement under the Military Claims
Act,130 two circuit courts have reached opposite results. The Fifth Circuit
dismissed a suit under the Tort Claims Act for loss of earnings and dis-
ability on the ground that a prior recovery under the Military Claims Act
122. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1948).
123. Heath v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 196 (W.D. Ala. 1949).
124. See cases cited in notes 84-87 supra.
125. United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1949), acting upon direc-
tions given in Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). The court held that
National Service Life Insurance payments made to the parents were not deductible
and that the tortfeasor could not claim the benefit thereof merely because it was also
the insurer.
126. Wade v. United States, 170 F.2d 298 (1st Cir. 1948); Marino v. United
States, 84 F. Supp. 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
127. White v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1948).
128. White v. United States. supra note 127.
129. Parr v. United States, 172 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1949), affirming, 78 F. Supp.
693 (D. Kan. 1948). But cf. Wham v. United States, 18 U.S.L. WaaK 2380 (C.A.
D.C. Jan. 30, 1950) (Receipt of benefits from a Police Welfare Fund partially sup-
ported by federal funds not a bar to suit for damages under the Act).
130. 57 STAT. 372 (1943), 31 U.S.C. §223(b) (1946) (repealed by the Tort
Claims Act as to claims based on negligence).
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for property damages and medical expenses was a final and conclusive
settlement and that the plaintiff's claim had, therefore, already been disposed
of when the Tort Claims Act was passed.' 3' In a similar case, the First
Circuit held that the prior recovery merely diminished the damages pro
tanto but could not constitute a settlement of the claim as under the Military
Claims Act no legal right of action existed, the War Department merely
being authorized to compensate injured parties for certain specified items
of loss.'
3 2
Claimants seeking administrative settlement are restricted in sub-
sequent suits to the amounts originally claimed but for this purpose an
original claim in excess of $1,000 will be considered a nullity and will not
preclude suit for a greater amount. 3 3 But where the injured party filed a
claim with the Post Office Department for $2,500 and later reduced it to
$1,000 with express reservation of her right to later sue for the larger
amount, it was held that the attempted reservation was invalid as an attempt
by the claimant to alter the terms of the Act and her damages were there-
after limited to the lesser amount.'3 4 However, where the original claim,
under $1,000, was for property damages only, the claimant can increase the
amount in a later suit by the amount of medical expenses incurred.1a 5
The Act establishes maximum attorney fees and makes it a misde-
meanor for an attorney to accept more than such amounts. 30 Where the
claim is disposed of by settlement, the fee may not exceed 10% of the
recovery, and where suit is instituted a fee of 20% of the recovery is au-
thorized, with discretion in the court to fix a fair amount in each case.'
37
Where claimant and his attorney had agreed in advance to a fee of 10%, to
be increased to 20% if appealed with brief and providing that an inter-
mediate rate should be fixed if appealed without brief, the court approved
of the arrangement, finding nothing in the Act to forbid it.'
3 8
TIME LIMITATIONS
The Act provides that suit thereunder must be brought within one year
after accrual of the claim.' 39 It is well settled that in the event of a conflict
131. Jordan v. United States, 170 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1948).
132. Wade v. United States, 170 F.2d 298 (1st Cir. 1948). This result seems
the more sound as the prior payment was merely the settlement of a noral obliga-
tion which was not coextensive with the later claim. Accord, Cerri v. United States,
80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948) (claim pending under Military Claims Act at time
of enactment of the Tort Claims Act was thereafter denied by the War Department) ;
Craun v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 840 (M.D. Pa. 1948) (claim withdrawn before
suit under the Tort Claims Act).
133. Siciliano v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1949).
134. Carlson v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
135. Siciliano v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1949).
136. 28 U.S.C. §2678 (1948).
137. The courts have evinced a tendency towards liberality in this respect. E.g.,
Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948) (20% of $22,500) ; Barnett
v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Fla. 1948) (20% of $15,000) ; Van Wie v.
United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948) ($1,250 out of $7,571) ; Lowe v.
United States, 83 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (20% of $4,500); Siciliano v.
United States, 85 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1949) ($1,200 out of $6,882); Marino v.
United States, 84 F. Supp. 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (20% of $19,999).
138. MacHale v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 372 (W.D. Wash. 1948).
139. "or within one year after the date of the enactment of the Act, whichever
is later", 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1948). This latter provision is now of purely
academic interest as it ceased to have any practical effect on August 2, 1947, one year
after passage of the Act. Prior to that time the Government had made abortive
attempts to avoid it by invoking the various state limitation periods. Burkhardt v.
United States, 165 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1947), reversing, 70 F. Supp. 982 (D. Md.
1947); Kahn v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Cal. 1948); Sweet v. United
States, 71 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
with a state limitation of a lesser period, this provision would govern.140
"We shall look to the law of the state for the purpose of defining the action-
able injury for which liability shall exist . . . but to the Act itself for the
limitations of time within which action shall be instituted to enforce the
liability." 141 This time limitation has been the subject of strict construc-
tion by the courts. Where the War Department delayed action for almost
two years before finally rejecting a claim for administrative settlement and
suit was brought within a year after such final action, judgment was
rendered for the Government on the ground that neither action nor neglect
on the part of Government officials could extend the time for suit which
Congress had limited.142 The period runs from the date of the wrongful
act or omission and a new period is not commenced by a later claim for
indemnity arising from the tort.143 However, where the wrongful act com-
plained of was the driving of deep wells on the claimant's land in June,
1942 so as to drain off her private well, it was held that the complaint
showed a continuing trespass within the limitation period.
44
By statute, minors are given three years after attaining majority in
which to enforce any claims arising against the United States during mi-
nority. 45  In Perry v. United States 146 a child who had been injured by
an army motorcycle in 1943 attempted unsuccessfully to employ this statute
to bring her claim within the Act. The complaint was dismissed on the
ground that the statute concerned presupposes a cause of action and cannot
be used to create one.
Claims for less than $1,000 are barred unless presented to the appro-
priate federal agency within one year, in which event the period is extended
until six months after withdrawal of the claim from the agency or until final
administrative disposition. But where a claim in excess of $1,000 is mis-
takenly submitted to the agency and thereafter, one year since the alleged
tort having elapsed in the meanwhile, the claimant reduces the claim below
$1,000, such reduction cannot have retroactive effect so as to toll the period
and the claim is barred.1
4 7
EXCEPTIONS
The Act specifically excepts from its operation twelve classes of
claims.148  These are so worded as to leave little room for construction as
140. Burkhardt v. United States, note 139 supra. Whether the question will ever
again be raised is extremely doubtful as no state has a limitation period of less than
one year for a tort action.
141. Id. at 871. See Wiltse v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. La. 1947)
for a similar opinion with respect to a state peremption statute under which the right
of action expires of itself if not acted upon within the stated period.
142. Anderegg v. United States, 171 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 967 (1949). The court said that it is immaterial whether the time limitation is
a condition of the right to sue or a limitation upon the remedy but indicated that it
inclined toward the former.
143. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. United States, 175 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Balboa
Shipping Co. v. Standard Fruit & Steamship Co., 85 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
144. Lemaire v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 498 (D. Mass. 1948).
145. 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) (1948).
146. 170 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1948).
147. Marino v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ; accord, Franzino
v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 10 (D.N.J. 1949).
148. 28 U.S.C. §2680 (1948). The claims excepted are: (a) Claims based
upon acts or omissions of an employee, exercising due care in the execution of a
statute or regulation, or based upon the performance of a discretionary function; (b)
Losses through the operation of the postal system; (c) Losses resulting from certain
tax and custom duties; (d) Suits in admiralty covered by certain statutes; (e) Losses
resulting from the administration of the Trading With The Enemy Act; (f) Losses
resulting from the administration of the quarantine laws; (g) Injuries or damages
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to their meaning and application, with the result that only four of them
have been the subject of litigation.
Exception (a)-Discretionary Acts.-In Denny v. United States 140
an army officer alleged that the failure of an army hospital to dispatch an
ambulance promptly when called resulted in his wife being delivered of a
still-born child. The pertinent army regulations provided that medical
care should be furnished to dependents of military personnel whenever
practicable and the circuit court, affirming the dismissal below, held that
this clearly made the alleged wrongful act a discretionary one within the
meaning of the exception. Similarly, where, after clinical conferences in
compliance with appropriate Veterans Administration directives, a psy-
chotic patient was discharged from a Government hospital as cured and
shortly thereafter killed plaintiff's intestate, the claim, founded on alleged
negligence in discharging a dangerous patient, was dismissed as based upon
a discretionary act of a Government employee.5 ° The same result was at-
tained where the claimant complained of the flooding of his lands due to
alleged negligence in the construction of river dikes by the army engineers
in pursuance of a stream development plan approved by Congress.' 5 ' Where
authority was granted by Executive Order to seize and operate coal mines
in such manner as the Administrator "may deem necessary in the interest
of the war effort," the decision not to operate certain seized mines was held
to be a discretionary act so as to preclude suit by the owner for loss of
profits and damages.152 However, where a livestock operator held exclu-
sive grazing privileges on federal lands and Department of the Interior
employees refused to cancel earlier conflicting permits held by adjacent
lessees, it was held that such refusal was not a discretionary act in that no
employee of the United States has discretion to permit third persons to
interfere with exclusive privileges granted by the Government.5 3 Similarly,
where a woman suffered a complete mental collapse as a result of being
grilled for 32 hours, while she was convalescing from a major operation,
by an army sergeant of the Criminal Investigation Department, recovery
was granted. The court held that the tort was not in exercising discretion
to interrogate but in the manner in which the interrogation was conducted,
the situation being analogous to malpractice cases in which the tort lies not
in the decision to treat but in the manner of treatment.15 4  In general, how-
occurring while passing through the Panama Canal or while in Canal Zone waters;
(h) Claims arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment or arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights; (i) Losses resulting from regulation of the monetary system
and fiscal operations of the Treasury; 0) Claims arising out of combatant activities
of the armed forces in time of war; (k) Claims arising in foreign countries; (1)
Claims arising from activities of the Tennessee Valley Administration.
149. 171 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949).
150. Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ala. 1949). The court
suggested the following test for discretionary acts, at 432, "The Government could
not be liable under the substantive law unless the servant might also be liable there-
under."
151. Thomas v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
152. Old King Coal Co. v. United States, 18 U.S.L. WaK 2292 (S.D. Iowa Dec.
5, 1949).
153. Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738 (10th Cir. 1949).
154. Hambleton v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 994 (W.D. Mich. 1949). (The
interrogation, incident to investigation of the claimant's husband, had extended to
intimate marital details not pertinent to the investigation.)
ever, the cases manifest a tendancy to construe this exception strictly and
in favor of the Government.3
5 5
Exception (h)-Willful Torts.-This section has been invoked to
dismiss a claim predicated upon improper search and imprisonment by
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.' 5" The phrase "interference
with contract rights" in this exception has been held to be a term of art
limited to the particular species of tort normally designated by these words
and not including all torts committed upon persons sustaining contract re-
lations with the Government and arising from such relations. 15 7
Exception (f)-Combat Activities.-The only substantial problems of
construction which have confronted the courts under these sections of the
Act have been the scope of the phrases "combat activities" in Exception (j)
and "foreign country" in Exception (k). A death caused by a pipe falling
from an army fighter plane during maneuvers in the Zone of the Interior
during wartime was held not to be incident to combat activities.158 In
Johnson v. United States 159 a navy floating magazine which had returned
from the combat area after the cessation of hostilities was forced to lie at
anchor away from the port because it carried unexpended ammunition.
The waste oil which it discharged polluted the claimant's clam beds. The
court held that the exception applied only to claims arising out of combatant
activities during time of war and reversed the dismissal below.160 In
Perucki v. United States 161 a contrary result was reached, the court con-
struing the exception to read: "arising out of combatant activities during
time of war." In that case, a veteran, while being examined by a Veterans
Administration physician in connection with a combat caused disability,
suffered severe burns when the physician applied lighted matches to his legs
during reflex tests. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that the
injury arose out of combat activities.10 2
Exception (k)-Foreign Countries.-Complaints based on injuries to
American nationals in various overseas areas during and after the war have
been summarily dismissed on the ground that neither conquest nor occupa-
tion, nor both, can make such areas any less foreign countries within the
155. But cf. State of Md. v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414 (4th
Cir. 1949) for an ancillary holding that the duties of the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration as a landlord are not discretionary within the meaning of the Act; accord,
Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949) (negligent surgery not a dis-
cretionary act).
156. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947) ; accord, Ekberg v. United
States, 76 F. Supp. 99 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
157. Nicholson v. United States, 177 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1949). (Plaintiff's con-
tract with the United States for the use of prisoners of war established procedures for
claims thereunder for damages "which are in excess of those normally occasioned
by civil workers . . . without prejudice to any other rights which the contractor
may have." The court held that this provision did not exclude a claim under the
Act for a negligently caused fire).
158. Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372 (W.D. La. 1947).
159. 170 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1948).
160. This result seems sound as once actual hostilities have ceased there is little
reason why the Government should not be able to measure up to the ordinary stand-
ards of due care.
161. 80 F. Supp. 959 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
162. The causation seems rather remote in this case. A strict application of this
interpretation might easily lead to obviously absurd results, as, for example, if a
combat-injured veteran while at a Government hospital for examination should be
run down by a Government vehicle being negligently driven upon the hospital grounds.
Cf. Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949) (postwar surgery not
incident to combat).
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meaning of the exception. 1' The general rationale is that any area not
actually a component part or political subdivision of the United States is a
foreign country on the theory that Congress could not have intended to
expose the Government to claims predicated upon the laws of a foreign
nation.1
0 4
The question was finally resolved by the Supreme Court in the Spelar
case. A citizen of New York was killed in a plane crash at Harmon Field
in Newfoundland which was occupied by the United States under a ninety-
nine year lease and executive agreement with the British government. His
administratrix filed suit under the Act and the wrongful death statute of
Newfoundland in the New York District Court which was then faced with
the problem of deciding whether Harmon Field was a foreign country for
the purposes of the Act. Although admittedly troubled by the decision of
the Supreme Court in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell165 that Bermuda,
occupied by the United States under the same lease, was a possession for
the purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the court, nevertheless,
dismissed the complaint. Its decision was grounded upon a lack of Con-
gressional intent to expose the Government to liability under Newfoundland
law and a holding that the provision of the Act conferring jurisdiction upon
the district courts "including the United States district courts for the Ter-
ritories and possessions of the United States" clearly made the Act inap-
plicable as there is no such court for Newfoundland. 66 The circuit court
disagreed, saying: "It is difficult to believe that an air base which is a
possession under one Act is a foreign country, no less, under another . . .
it is on the whole fantastic to consider this territory a foreign country within
the meaning of a local statute affecting the relation of this government and
private persons." 167 It dismissed the jurisdictional argument by pointing
out that suit could be brought under the Act in the plaintiff's district and
disposed of the lex loci delicti question in these words: "Such reliance on
foreign law as the source of rights locally enforced is of course not unknown
in our courts." 168 The Supreme Court found the reasoning of the district
court more persuasive and dismissed the case, saying: "In brief, though
Congress was ready to lay aside a great portion of the sovereign's ancient
and unquestioned immunity to suit, it was unwilling to subject the United
States to liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power. The
legislative will must be respected. The present suit, premised entirely upon
Newfoundland law (of wrongful death), may not be asserted against the
United States in contravention of that will." 169
CONCLUSION
In general the manner in which the Federal Tort Claims Act has with-
stood the test of over three years of judicial construction reflects favorably
163. Brewer v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1948) (Okinawa) ;
Brunnell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (Saipan) ; Straneri v.
United States. 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (Belgium).
164. See Brunnell v. United States, supra note 163, at 72.
165. 335 U.S. 377 (1948). See Note, Applicability of Federal Statutes to Non-
contiguous Areas, 97 U. OF P. L. REv. 866 (1949).
166. Spelar v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1948).
167. Spelar v. United States, 171 F.2d 208, 209 (2d Cir. 1948).
168. Id. at 210.
169. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949). The Court found it
unnecessary to overrule Vermilya-Brown since that case had postulated that the lease
in question affected no transfer of sovereignty. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson,
while concurring in the result, disagreed in this respect.
upon its draftsmen. The few serious problems of interpretation which have
arisen have been due not so much to defects in the Act as to the Janus-like
attitude of the courts in their struggles to reconcile the legislative fiat that
the United States shall no longer be immune to suit in tort with the ancient
doctrine that "no suit or action can be brought against the King, even in
civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over Him." 170 The
district courts, especially, have evidenced a general reluctance to depart
from the clearly defined paths of the common law doctrine and to create
their own precedents. But with the passage of time they ceased to be
disquieted by the spectacle of their Government standing before the bar as a
defendant in a tort suit and settled down to an impartial application of the
Act to the merits of each case. An excellent example of this process is
furnished by the so-called subrogation cases.
The Act has received a substantially uniform construction and where
there have been clear divergencies between the circuit courts the Supreme
Court has not hesitated to grant certiorari and resolve the conflict. There
remain only two such divergencies. These involve the rights of armed
forces personnel with respect to service-connected injuries and the proce-
dural-substantive question as to whether the United States and individuals
may be joined as party defendants. It is contemplated that the Supreme
Court will dispose of the former in the near future."1 The latter problem
poses so many diverse questions of both procedural and substantive rights
that no one case could dispose of them all. The only adequate remedy
would seem to be a legislative pronouncement by way of amendment.
No discussion of the Act would be complete without the now classic
statement of Judge Cardozo: "The exemption of the sovereign from suit
involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not
to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been
announced." 172 To this can be added only the venerable maxim: Lex non
exacte definit, sed arbitrio boni yiri permittit.1
73
R. F. M.
Restrictions on the Right to Bear Arms: State and
Federal Firearms Legislation
"No one shall come before the justices, or go, or ride armed," com-
manded the Statute of Northumberland, enacted in 1328.1 Firearms had
not yet been introduced into the British Isles, but it was already consid-
ered necessary to prohibit the carrying of weapons in public places, to en-
courage peaceful behavior. The development of society toward the concept
of community sanctions for dangerous acts, i.e., punishment for crime, and
the correlative concern for diminishing the frequency of antisocial acts, i.e.,
prevention of crime and accidents, are twin impetuses behind legislation
regulating the use of weapons. Firearms represent the chief danger. The
affirmative side of the use of firearms by the private citizen is substantial.
170. 1 BL. Comms. *242.
171. Certiorari has been granted in the Feres and Jefferson cases, notes 79, 80
supra.
172. Anderson v. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 30
(1926).
173. "The law does not define exactly but trusts in the judgment of a good man."
1. 1328, 2 Edw. III, c. 3; Knight's Case, 3 Mod. 117, 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B.
1686).
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